Behavior Based Threat Assessment As a tool for the Federal Protective Service in Mitigating Directed Violence

Aaron L. Godbey

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.regis.edu/theses

Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons

Recommended Citation
https://epublications.regis.edu/theses/671

This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by ePublications at Regis University. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Regis University Theses by an authorized administrator of ePublications at Regis University. For more information, please contact epublications@regis.edu.
Use of the materials available in the Regis University Thesis Collection ("Collection") is limited and restricted to those users who agree to comply with the following terms of use. Regis University reserves the right to deny access to the Collection to any person who violates these terms of use or who seeks to or does alter, avoid or supersede the functional conditions, restrictions and limitations of the Collection.

The site may be used only for lawful purposes. The user is solely responsible for knowing and adhering to any and all applicable laws, rules, and regulations relating or pertaining to use of the Collection.

All content in this Collection is owned by and subject to the exclusive control of Regis University and the authors of the materials. It is available only for research purposes and may not be used in violation of copyright laws or for unlawful purposes. The materials may not be downloaded in whole or in part without permission of the copyright holder or as otherwise authorized in the "fair use" standards of the U.S. copyright laws and regulations.
BEHAVIOR BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A TOOL FOR THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE IN MITIGATING DIRECTED VIOLENCE

by

Aaron L. Godbey

has been approved

September, 2011

APPROVED:

__________________________ Robert Collins, PhD.______________, Faculty Facilitator

__________________________ Robert Collins, PhD.______________, Faculty Advisor
ABSTRACT

Behavior Based Threat Assessment as a Tool for the
Federal Protective Service in Mitigating Directed Violence

The popular culture behind law enforcement of protecting and serving is slightly misrepresented because the majority of law enforcement organizations do not have a protective mission but a responsive mission. Select organizations such as the Federal Protective Service (FPS) has more than a responsive, investigative responsibility to the community they police; they also have a responsibility to protect their community from potential criminal and terrorist acts that have not yet happened. Utilizing the newest research from the Department of Homeland Security and their partnership with mental health providers, the United States Attorney’s Office and scholarly researchers this article provides the FPS a Critical Path To Violence model to better protect the government. This Critical Path To Violence analyzes an individual’s psychology by observing their behavior through a well defined progression that has been proven to lead to violence. This progression once observed then can be very specifically disrupted to prevent violent attacks, while maximizing resources and increasing effectiveness of the FPS Special Agents and Inspectors.
AKNOWLEDGMENTS

Beth, Riley, Caleb and Josh Godbey – Thank you for missing me while I worked for hours upon hours for various classes and homework assignments. Thank you for pretending to care when I wanted to explain my newest insights into homeland security theories that nobody should be excited about. However, I thank you most of all for your love and support as I worked towards bettering myself and the world around us.

Dr Robert Collins – Thank you Dr Collins for your insight and wisdom into the education process. Thank you for ensuring that I got exactly what I was looking for out of my masters. The last two years really flew by, I sincerely hope that we can continue to work together in the future.

Adam Kowalski, Regional Intelligence Agent, FPS / DHS – Thank you for answering my many calls and emails asking questions that you probably did not have time for. Your assistance and support was extremely valuable to me. When you venture into your masters please think of me for whatever I can do to help.

AJ Jackson, Regional Director, FPS / DHS – Thank you for your willingness to help me in completing my studies even after my time with FPS was complete. Your time and advice is always appreciated, I hope that FPS is able to find value in my research.
Jerry Godbey & Zach Graham – Thank you for your many hours of editing, critiquing and asking questions that made me think. Your assistance was crucial in my ability to provide a well organized, easy to understand argument. Thank you also for your insight into the world around us and the potential application and areas of concern for my research.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1  
Statement of the Problem .............................................................................................................. 3  
  FPS Current Protective Investigation Program (PIP) ................................................................. 4  
  FPS Potential Behavior Based Threat Assessment ................................................................. 4  
Overview of the Problem .............................................................................................................. 7  
Purpose of the Project .................................................................................................................. 8  
List of Definitions ....................................................................................................................... 9  
Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................................... 10  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ........................................................................................................ 11  
  Research In Federal Law Enforcement ...................................................................................... 11  
Directed Violence ..................................................................................................................... 14  
Types of Directed Violence ....................................................................................................... 16  
  Stalking .................................................................................................................................. 16  
  Workplace Violence ................................................................................................................. 17  
  Presidential Assassination & Public Figures .......................................................................... 17  
Complex Interaction of Risk Factors (Mental, Physical & Social Health) ................................ 18  
Violence in the Government ...................................................................................................... 20  
Legal Concerns Of Investigating Threats .................................................................................. 21  
Threat Assessments ................................................................................................................... 23  
  Grievance .............................................................................................................................. 26  
  Ideation .................................................................................................................................. 26  
  Research & Planning .............................................................................................................. 27  
  Preparation .............................................................................................................................. 29  
  Breach ................................................................................................................................... 29  
  Chapter Summary .................................................................................................................. 30  
METHOD ................................................................................................................................... 32  
  Chapter Summary .................................................................................................................. 33
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Studies</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy McVeigh</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Stack</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnny Wicks</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulhakim Muhammad</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael C. Finton</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Fraticelli</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Limitations</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Research Ideas</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPS Critical Path to Violence</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame Of Progression Down CPV</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Mitigation Strategies</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documenting Dangerousness For Court Proceedings</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Policy Changes</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Training</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of a Behavioral Analysis Unit</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRITICAL PATH TO VIOLENCE</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTED VIOLENCE BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example Training Power Point For Critical Path To Violence</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Critical Path To Violence .................................................................................................................. 26
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

There has been great advancement in the use of both psychological profiling and behavior analysis in the world of criminology through applied research. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) / Department of Homeland Security (DHS) now has the opportunity to utilize these advancements by bringing together information which identify a "Critical Path to Violence" and use this knowledge to mitigate or even prevent future attacks on the federal government. Using both psychological profiling and behavior analysis will provide the ability to predict what an individual’s behavior looks like as they proceed through the psychological processes (Critical Path to Violence) necessary to believe that an attack would create positive change. The US Secret Service (USSS) has conducted a vast amount of research on these critical paths and has set a precedent for law enforcement organizations that have a protective mission. Many other law enforcement organizations have since modeled their investigative techniques after the USSS, such as the US Capital Police, and the US Marshals Service and the Los Angeles Police Department. These departments have adapted this model to their needs by creating special sections that focus on identifying these critical paths and mitigating the violence that they would otherwise result in.

The FPS has the organizational structure to facilitate a modified version of this model but would require more depth and focus during investigations of threats and the collection/analysis
of research information in order to see the significance in the results. Since protecting from directed violence is only a small part of FPS’ mission, and only one of the many risks that FPS mitigates; FPS already has a well thought out organizational structure in place that would lend itself to a behavioral analysis program. Furthermore, FPS has a Threat Management Branch (TMB) with senior leadership and a small team of Special Agents in each of the FPS Regions which are responsible for investigating directed violence. The TMB is tasked with dual missions:

1) *Intelligence collection, analysis and distribution*

2) *Leading FPS investigative efforts (FPS, 2011)*

In cases of directed violence these two missions often merge resulting in both an intelligence operation to mitigate threat and an investigation of complex criminal investigation.

The policy that dictates the management of threats is the Protective Investigations Program (PIP). On a webpage for the PIP, FPS explains that this program was created in 2004 with the objective of preventing “an attack on persons and facilities designated as FPS protectees” (FPS, 2011). FPS believes that this program brings together several of FPS resources to mitigate threats including:

- Initial patrol response by FPS uniformed police officers
- Full investigation by FPS special agents
- Prosecution by the U.S. Attorney’s Office or State Prosecutor's Office
- Physical security enhancements and countermeasures
- Security briefings and workplace violence seminars administered by FPS law enforcement personnel
- Suspicious surveillance detection initiatives designed to detect pre-incident indicators of threats to federal employees and facilities. (FPS, 2011)

There are three key problems that FPS routinely sees in implementation of the PIP. These problems seem to exacerbate each other. Firstly, a “full investigation by FPS special
agents” (FPS, 2011) does not include behavior based threat assessments and focuses primarily on the immediate facts available for the case. Secondly, prosecutors with the U.S. Attorney’s Office or State Prosecutor’s Office often see threats of directed violence as lesser crimes and thus either refuse to prosecute or plead the crimes down to a misdemeanor or even a warning. The final problem at hand is the use of behavioral indicators that have not been well defined, which result in surveillance based on the gut instincts of the agents or leadership and not based on empirical evidence or statistical probability. This causes confusion and frustration both on part of the agents and the leadership resulting generally in the surveillance not being accomplished due to concerns about legality. Therefore, there is a case for bringing these elements together in a behavior based threat assessment process as defined by the USSS. Such a process would help FPS conduct a more thorough investigation that would better identify mitigation strategies, assist with prosecution, and assess the potential means of the attack for more accurate and efficient surveillance.

Statement of the Problem

The Federal Protective Service (FPS) / Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should advance its understanding of threat based behavior by developing a standardized Critical Path to Violence (CPV) towards government facilities. This CPV would assist agents in understanding, communicating and documenting the behaviors that lead to threatening behavior or actions. This better understanding would create a greater awareness of the most efficient methods for mitigating threats. FPS is responsible for over 9,000 different properties and these properties see over 1,000,000 staff and visitors per day (FPS, 2011). With over 9000 potential targets for criminal and terrorist groups and a law enforcement staff of just over 900, FPS is tasked with a virtually impossible mission. It is imperative that FPS better understand, prioritize and mitigate the threats investigated in a manner that is simple, easily understood and effective. Analyzing
the CPV would define a particular threat through an FPS lens and then predict and quantify what the subject’s future actions may have been had FPS not intervened. This insight helps with both prosecutions and other mitigation strategies. The current difficulties are best understood through the use of the following two examples.

**FPS Current Protective Investigation Program (PIP)**

John Smith is reported to have threatened “maybe I would get better service if I came in with a bomb” according to Social Security Administration (SSA) employees. FPS responds and does a comprehensive interview of employees, retrieves video recording of the incident and does a criminal history check of Mr. Smith. The case is passed to a FPS Special Agent who within 24 hours approaches Mr. Smith’s house with two local police officers. Mr. Smith invites the agent and officers into his house and consents to a search of his house for bomb making materials. A very basic search is conducted and reveals no items which might be used to make a bomb. The Special Agent talks to Mr. Smith about the seriousness of making threats and has Mr. Smith sign a piece of paper saying that he will not make another threat or could be charged with this threat along with other crimes as applicable. All reports are filled and no other contact with Mr. Smith happens unless there is an additional violation of the law.

**FPS Potential Behavior Based Threat Assessment**

John Smith is reported to have threatened “maybe I would get better service if I came in with a bomb” according to Social Security Administration (SSA) employees. FPS responds and does a comprehensive interview of employees, retrieves video recording of the incident and does a criminal history check of Mr. Smith. The case is passed to FPS Special Agents who conducts a
Behavior Based Threat Assessment. FPS agents speak with the SSA supervisors to try and understand if there is a grievance. The supervisors state Mr. Smith used to come in regularly a year ago, after he reported that his grandma and grandpa died at fault of the SSA. Mr. Smith reported that payments to the grandma were wrongfully canceled which prevented grandma from paying her heat bills. Her heat was turned off and she died from hypothermia in her sleep. Grandpa died less than a month later of grief. Supervisors reported that Mr. Smith came in to the office daily asking for an apology but refused to fill out the appropriate paperwork to request an investigation from SSA.

Nine months to a year ago Mr. Smith stopped coming into the office until the day of the threat. When he came in recently, he appeared very cold, angry and looked like he had been drinking. He immediately asked for a supervisor and when told one was not available he started cursing and stated “I bet you I would get better service if I had a bomb”. He then turned and left. Searches of public information revealed that 9 months ago Mr. Smith sold his home in a suburb of Denver and moved to a very small town where there is known to be a large, boisterous, anti-government group.

Mr. Smith was reported to have worked for ABC Company prior to his moving to this small town. Agents spoke with Mr. Smith’s previous supervisor at ABC Company who stated Mr. Smith was a great guy until that unfortunate accident. He quickly began coming to work drunk and associating with some not good people from somewhere in the mountains. He talked a lot about how bad the government was and that he wished there was a way he could fix all of his problems. Interviews with other contacts from this time period revealed the same shift in attitude.
Based on the more in depth interviews an SSA employee felt more comfortable reporting additional suspicious behavior and informed the agents that he saw Mr. Smith just sitting in his car by the employee parking lot. This type of information is often deemed unimportant by non law enforcement as they do not see the significance in the behavior, where as if they feel they have a relationship with the law enforcement staff then they can call directly and ask if the observation is important. The employee stated that he sat there for over an hour while the employee was at lunch as he was still there when the employee came back from lunch. Agents received a search warrant for Mr. Smith’s house to include bomb making materials, other weapons and items used to plan an attack such as notebooks, photographs and digital evidence from his personal computer. Agents serve the warrant and find several hand written notebook with comments regarding ideation and plans for potential attacks, communications through a website known to law enforcement to teach individuals how to build bombs, photographs of employees of the SSA to include them at work and at home and a newly purchased semi automatic pistol with extended magazines. The interview with Mr. Smith shows that he is still deeply concerned with the state of the government and that his new friends are helping him to understand the injustice against him. He is still deeply injured by the original event and does not believe there is any way to fix that. He denies that he was going to attack the SSA office.

Obviously, not every case looks like the one above but with the current PIP there is not enough time or resources dedicated to the case to determine the full facts involved. At this point the agents have enough to arrest Mr. Smith for the threat but may also be able to look at other avenues to mitigate the threat. These might include grief counseling, or arranging for an apology from the SSA, both of which may help to mitigate the threat. Putting Mr. Smith in jail without another mitigation strategy will most likely just delay the threat and not fully mitigate it.
Overview of the Problem

Threats are simple in origin to the mind of the threat maker but are difficult for law enforcement to understand or document. According to Merriam Webster, the definition of a threat is “an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury or damage”, however the Latin root’s meaning maybe more relevant in that it means to push or thrust (Merriam, 2011). Therefore to study the psychology of threats would also include the study of human behavior regarding threats. The reason for a threat is often personal and is generally known to the threat maker. Threats may originate from distress, fear, hatred or even disgust. Out of all of the different types of directed violence, threats are perhaps the most important for psychological examination for a couple of reasons. First it is the predecessor to other forms of violence. Even though threats can cause emotional harm they do not generally cause extreme physical harm to the individual being threatened. If an individual was to kill during the act of threatening, then there would be no need to threaten. Secondly, individuals that have already committed themselves to an act of violence have created other means for law enforcement to catch them and for the criminal justice system to administer justice. Lastly, threats are often down played by law enforcement because they are difficult to quantify, document and present to a judge.

For the purposes of this document, there will be no distinction between terrorist threats and any other threat of violence other than it is directed towards the federal government. It is interesting to note that in the context of threats, terrorists in the generic regard have already made threats and law enforcement is mitigating their potential attacks. Even though on an individual level some members of terrorist groups may still be at the very beginning of their Critical Path to Violence but are acting on the previous threat somebody else made. However, there are opportunities for new groups, lone wolf type individuals, home grown terrorists or even non-
terroristic individuals to make threats and display behaviors that are just as devastating as international terrorist attacks. Law enforcement must continue to assess these threats as they are made known and must be quantified so senior leadership, the criminal courts systems and the society in its entirety can make decisions about how to protect ourselves. Without performing some type of psychological assessment of the threat maker, how will law enforcement know the level of seriousness of the threat?

Purpose of the Project

To provide the Federal Protective Service (FPS) with a list of behaviors that when in a specific chronological order indicates an increased likelihood that the suspect will commit an act of violence. This project will also provide an ability to determine the applicability of behavior based analysis in law enforcement organizations that currently do not have such programs but have a protective mission. This will be accomplished by comparing historical examples of violence against the US Government to the US Secret Service’s Critical Path to Violence model. In doing this a quick reference guide for investigating directed violence against federal property will be created. Furthermore, a list of case studies will demonstrate the applicability of the behavior based threat assessment models. Lastly the project will result in a formal recommendation to FPS as to how to efficiently integrate these tools into the current Protective Investigations Program (PIP) and provide some limited examples of how a behavioral analysis program could be utilized as a strategic tool.
List of Definitions

**Directed Violence** – Violence that is directed at a specific target based on a previous grievance.

**Department of Homeland Security (DHS)** – Is the department of the US Government that is responsible for protection of the homeland.

**Federal Protective Service** – Is the agency within the DHS that is responsible for the protection of federally owned, leased or occupied property.

**Threat** – The communication that identifies the potential for violence.

**Risk Factors** – The observable indicators that allow an investigator to identify behaviors or psychology that relates to directed violence.

**Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)** – A conglomeration of federal, state and local agencies that work together to investigate crimes of terrorism. Each individual JTTF is managed by the regional FBI offices, FPS participates in the JTTF on both local and national levels.

**US Secret Service** – Agency within the DHS that is responsible for protecting specific dignitaries to include the President of the United States. Also responsible for several research projects that helped evolve law enforcement’s use of behavior analysis and the Critical Path to Violence.

**United States Code** – The criminal laws that are enforced by most federal law enforcement including the FPS.
Terrorism – The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”.

Violence – An expression of intention to inflict evil, injury or damage (Merriam, 2011).

Critical Path to Violence – A list of behaviors exhibited in chronological order which demonstrates the psychological ability to commit acts of violence.

Chapter Summary

After a violent attack everyone wants to be able to say that they did everything they could to prevent or mitigate the attack. Since research began in the mid 1990’s, USSS and their partners have developed a new tool for assessing threats of violence. The behavioral based threat assessment has been fully adopted by the USSS and the USSS is often seen as the primer protective law enforcement organization in the world. Their lessons learned and direct research is available to other law enforcement organizations such as the FPS to use to better enhance their protective missions. The USSS did not find easy to implement these new processes; however FPS is organizationally well suited to incorporate behavioral based threat assessments. In order to make this an improved mitigation strategy there must be the ability to conduct applied research in cooperation with FPS in order to determine what unique behavioral traits are exhibited prior to an attack on federal property. This project is the first step in identifying that Critical Path to Violence and developing a plan to create additional research opportunities resulting in a positive change in FPS’s ability to investigate, prosecute and mitigate cases of directed violence.
Chapter 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In order to better understand the issues surrounding directed violence, behavioral based threat assessments, the Critical Paths to Violence (CPV) concept and the incorporation of these concepts into a federal law enforcement entity such as the FPS, I conducted a thorough review of literature. This review included over 70 articles of peer reviewed research in various aspects of psychology and behavior based threat assessments. As applying the research from psychology and criminology is relatively new to law enforcement, the first area of concern was the ability for federal law enforcement to combine applied research, psychology, and criminology into a functional multi-disciplinary organizational model.

Research In Federal Law Enforcement

*Integrating Research and Practice in Federal Law Enforcement: Secret Service*

*Applications of Behavioral Science Expertise to Protect the President* was published in *Behavioral Science and the Law* magazine in 1998 and written by Dr. Margaret Coggins, Dr. Marisa Pynchon and Dr. Joel Dvoskin. The article discusses specific areas of growth between professional, scientific researchers and the US Secret Service (USSS) as it pertains to behavioral analysis in threat investigations. The USSS and the various partnerships they have created in analyzing behavior of individuals that pose a threat to protected individuals is considered the most advanced in both psychological scientific research and criminology fields concerning
violence. The article explains the importance of developing this partnership is to first understand their symbiotic relationship. Researchers need firsthand accounts and information of potential acts of violence to research as the events are unfolding to make predictions and study the results. Whereas, law enforcement needs the researchers' analysis to use in court to prevent potential future acts of violence, to justify their actions and to ultimately mitigate the threat. Within the USSS the result of this partnership was the National Threat Assessment Center’s (NTAC) Exception Case Study Project.

The article identified a couple key problems with integrating both law enforcement and psychological researcher into projecting targeted violence. First is that law enforcement agencies are not trained in managing crime proactively and is not well suited to quantifying threats. Threats are generally seen as a lesser crime and in the eyes of the courts are generally considered misdemeanors, meaning that there is less emphasis placed on the conviction of these crimes. Still, the Los Angeles Police Department, US Capital Police and the US Marshals Service have created proactive programs to investigate targeted violence. “Each of these organizations has recognized that their mission extends well beyond purely investigating and enforcement responsibilities, to the much more daunting task of protection and the prevention of violence” (Coggins, pg. 3, 1998). The recognition of this additional role has created professional groups such as the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP), which helps to develop partnerships between clinical psychologists, criminologists, threat assessment professionals and law enforcement. Both researchers and law enforcement are beginning to understand that the importance of investigating targeted violence to include stalking, harassment and threats. The understanding of the subject’s thoughts and behaviors towards the victims and
understanding them in relation to risk management solutions available to law enforcement is becoming essential to risk management strategies.

The USSS’s protective intelligence program has five key functions:

1) Identifying subjects who may pose a risk to one or more Secret Service protectees
2) Investigating the circumstances in which the threat occurred and the individual histories of the persons who may have made or posed the perceived threat
3) Evaluating the mental status of the subject
4) Assessing both the likelihood and the severity of risk posed by the subject, and
5) Implementing case management-type interventions aimed at managing those subjects who have been evaluated by the Secret Service as presenting a danger to Secret Service Protectors (Coggin, pg. 8, 1998).

Because of the USSS protective mission there was a focus on understanding the relationships and patterns of mental health as part of the evaluation and this focus created the need for applied research within the USSS.

In order to be able to make more informed decisions about the risks they were managing the USSS contracted with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) as a partner for a conference on behavioral health for clinicians and law enforcement. Throughout the 1980’s the USSS created a partnership with IOM that lead to more formalized liaison and research between the two groups. The partnership built a branch of the USSS called the Behavioral Research Program which was tasked with researching behavior and psycho-legal issues that might affect the USSS and their mission. The goals of this program included assessing the risk of individuals that may be a threat to protectees, study the factors that influence agent's judgments in evaluating risk posed by threats, study the attitude of mental health professionals in working with the USSS to mitigate violence, and study the impact of mental health law on the USSS and its ability to meet its goals.

Challenges found in partnering with the USSS included working on very time sensitive and secret projects with differing focus on research and responsibilities. Also, applying the
research and incorporating it into policy that impacted the mission caused “significant growing pains” (Coggins, 1998). This was partially alleviated by encouraging the participation of both internal and external resources into the Research Advisory Committee. The committee’s leadership would set research goals and facilitate the delicate balance of information and relationships between agents and researchers. The members would then provide regular input into the research process, mental health and criminal law, and policy as it pertained to the mission. One of the largest challenges that faced the committee was the need to ensure that the research was based on empirical, scientific study methods and external review was necessary to the organization’s successes and not a “liability or intrusion to the law enforcement process” (Coggins, pg 12, 1998). The committees’ ability to merge non-traditional research and applied processes created a widely respectable research program and shows the value in partnering psychological research with criminology. Their activity is credited with creating the next evolution in risk management concerning directed violence (described below in Threat Assessments).

Directed Violence

Dr. Randy Borum, Associate Professor and Director of the Psychology of Terrorism Initiative at the University of South Florida explains that Directed violence, like terrorism, is not easily defined (Borum, 2004). Dr. Borum’s interest is in the study of terrorism as a more transparent means for studying directed violence illustrates the behavioral aspects of violence. Dr. Borum further states that terrorist use a wide variety of criminal activity to support their operation but nearly all definitions of terrorism include the use or the threatened use of violence. In order to understand this violence Dr Borum provided his research on the history of the psychological research on violence.
Understanding violence seems to be just as difficult as understanding terrorism. As Dr. Borum explains, definitions of violence are just as vague as terrorism. He explains this by giving a variety of examples which include domestic violence, sexual predators, violence towards children, suicide bombers and homegrown terrorists; all of which have extremely different circumstances, emotional reactions to their stress and have various levels of violent behavior. However, most of society would contend that all the examples given are or could be violent. Dr. Borum explains “What might ‘cause’ or ‘explain’ behavior in one of these cases, might not in another. The point here is not to resolve the longstanding definitional debate, but to illustrate how the way in which practitioners and researchers view the problem of violence (and how it) affects practical issues and decisions in the ‘real world’” (Borum, 2004). Concerning threats we must identify the practical issues that affect the threat maker, the victim, and the responding agencies before we can make any type of substantial change in the psychology of threats.

Dr. Borum describes five basic theories that have been used to explain violence. The first being Instinct Theory which was partially realized by Freud who explained that there was a balance of life and death in every person’s life and that when disturbed, the death (or violence) was transposed onto society. Similarly, under the Instinct Theory inferences are drawn to the animal kingdom which describes animals as needing a certain amount of death to survive and thus humanity is programmed to maintain this balance. The second theory is the Drive Theory which states there is a direct correlation between frustration and aggression. However, Dr. Borum explains that this theory is not all inclusive because there are many incidents where frustration does not result in aggression and where aggression does not manifest from frustration. The third theory is the Social Learning Theory which describes violence as being learned through participation or direct observation and that the consequences are marginalized by the
aggressor making violence acceptable to the learner. The fourth theory is the Cognitive Theory which explains that an aggressor perceives reality different from the rest of society which may limit or make acceptable the reason for their actions or the consequences there of. The last theory is not truly a theory and has not been explored as much, but contends that psychology is not the only reason for violence and that there are most likely biological reasons for violence as well. These might include lack of balance of certain chemicals in the brain, genetic or non-genetic deformities, traumatic injury or use of drugs, etc… The truth does not reside in any of these theories but most likely a varying combination for each individual.

Types of Directed Violence

There are multiple types of directed violence but the primary types that have been studied or seem to hold a large amount of interests in psychology fields for future study include stalking, workplace violence and threats against dignitaries or public figures.

Stalking

Studies pertaining to stalking is very limited and literature primarily shows that the research conducted has to do with erotomanic stalking (where the stalker believes another to be in love with the subject), the dangerousness of stalking and potential responses to stalking. Most of the research appears to be on psychological abnormalities and other mental health or social issues present and not on the behavior itself.
Workplace Violence

Unlike stalking, workplace violence has been considerably studied with conclusions published to include potential reasons for workplace violence (similar to reasons for all violence), risk factors and even prevention programs. The State of Hawaii developed a working group to help develop a guide for Hawaiian businesses to better manage workplace violence issues. In this guide they review the expected warning signs of workplace violence but summarize by explaining that “it is important to understand, however, that signs and profiles do not predict that violence will occur, rather they merely indicate that there is more of a propensity for violence to occur” (Hawaii, 2001). However, as many of these types of guides are advising businesses and even government agencies to create policies and procedures for managing workplace violence, they all refer the issue to local law enforcement. Yet local law enforcement may be just as ill prepared to manage the issues surrounding workplace violence as the organizations that report it. Workplace violence often includes violence in hospitals and schools as well as other non-office type environments. In the event that there is a lack of a clear terroristic or ideological coercion of fear for political, social or religious gain, then targeted violence, as it pertains to the investigations that FPS performs, would fall under a workplace violence classification. Workplace violence is often thought of as violence from coworkers but in fact it is any violence that occurs in the workplace and could be from customers as well as coworkers.

Presidential Assassination & Public Figures

The majority of research on directed violence towards public figures has been performed by or in conjunction with the USSS. Until the completion of the Exceptional Case Study Project
most research was conducted based on retrospective analysis of case studies where not all the information was available. Studies into the causes for this type of violence have speculated that it comes from persons with issues of underlying inadequacies, pathological attachments, self-loathing, frustration or rage against women, strong sexual desires for their mother and broken homes that do not include a father figure (Coggins, 1998). Dr. Coggins, Dr. Pynchon and Dr. Dvoskin point out that most of this research has been speculative at best and is not based on empirical research (Coggins, 1998). They point out that some research has been noteworthy, to include “White House cases” which is where individuals that requested an audience with the President for various reasons were detained and evaluated by a USSS psychiatrist. There were several findings to include most individuals being white males, in their early 40s and single. This research would later help to define the need for understanding the relationship between associating with the President and various mental health disorders. The USSS in the Exception Case Study Program would then learn that individual physical, social and even emotional characteristics are not as important as the logical process behind the thinking and the behaviors that process is enforcing (Coggins, 1998).

Complex Interaction of Risk Factors (Mental, Physical & Social Health)

The use of Risk Factors (RF), to determine the likelihood of susceptibility to a disease, originated in epidemiology or the study of human disease and how it progresses through society. Epidemiologists use the RF to define the vulnerability an individual person has within a larger group of society. According to the CDC “In the United States, about 90% of lung cancer deaths in men and almost 80% of lung cancer deaths in women are due to smoking” (CDC, 2011), thus a RF for lung cancer is a history of smoking. RF has been used beyond epidemiology to analyze children and young adolescents’ potential violence at school in order to provide intervention
programs or increased monitoring of students who pose a risk of being violent. Law enforcement sub-organizations such as the FBI’s BAU and the USSS’s National Threat Assessment Center use RF in order to analyze violence towards victims or individuals they are assigned to protect. RF changes for every person in every situation and does not prove possible violence but may help to predict future problems and assist investigators in documenting items of concern that may directly or indirectly attributed to a violent act. Analyzing and researching RF gives law enforcement the ability to proactively identify individuals that may be violent in the future and provide the threat maker help as available. RF would not be probable cause to arrest an individual and would require a court order or consent for additional assessment or treatment of underlying reasons for display of the RF. In many states there are processes for doctors to assess the threat of individuals and order medical holds for psychological evaluation if specific criteria are met. This threshold may or may not be value to behavior based threat assessments depending on the state program and the mutual understanding of its use by medical staff and law enforcement.

There are several categories of RF which include emotional factors, social factors, cognitive factors and biological factors. For example if the threat received was from an individual in a gang culture, there might be more emphasis on the biological and social factors. In comparison a threat received from an anti-government extremist would most likely measure higher in the cognitive and emotional factors. As if psychology was not complicated enough, the analysis must also include individual versus group dynamics and whether the individual or groups belief changed or stayed the same in several areas. The application of psychology in criminology also requires a variety of expertise to ensure accuracy and effectiveness.
Violence in the Government

There are countless case studies of specific violent crimes but there are very limited numbers of studies that analyze the patterns or suggest possible solutions to violence. However, there has been a rise in public attention to violence in the workplace and more materials available to help senior managers manage violence in their workplace. There is obviously a terrorist threat to the federal government, a threat of violence from the mentally ill and lastly a threat from individuals that are mad at the government. However, the workplace violence classification has been more comprehensively studied and happens much more frequently. In *Dealing with Workplace Violence: a Guide for Agency Planners* the Office of Personnel Management help agency senior leaders and middle management understand what planning is needed to help identify, mitigate and respond to various types of workplace violence.

*Dealing with Workplace Violence* starts by explaining how an organization can plan for having problems with workplace violence. These strategies include creating policies, working groups, training and pre-employment screening. To demonstrate the appropriate response at the Federal level, OPM worked with various law enforcement to conduct 16 case studies based on real life situations. Even though these case studies do not provide much insight into the cases themselves, they do provide a broad overall picture of violence at Federal workplaces. The case studies include: shooting, viciously wounding of a coworker, suicide attempt, stalking, domestic violence, direct threats, veiled threats, threats made during counseling, threats made by ex-employees, threats made from non-employees, intimidation, disruptive behavior and frightening behavior. It is interesting to note that OPM wrote this document in conjunction with FPS and that over half of the case studies involve threats or intimidation (indirect threats). Even though
Legal Concerns Of Investigating Threats

Most investigations focus on the possession of evidence as the key for a government’s case against a suspect. Drugs, money, items of value and even trace evidence are used to prove that an individual committed a crime. In threat cases this is often hard to prove unless the individual acts out on the threat (and commits a separate crime), or unless the threat is recorded on some type of media for the courts to hear and / or see the threat themselves. 18 USC § 111 is a classic example of how particular the law is regarding threats and how that hinders law enforcements ability to protect the citizens. 18 USC § 111 states “Whoever… forcibly assaults, resists, oppose, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with (certain government employees) while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties…” (Cornell, 2011). To prove that an individual “intimidates” or threatens a certain government employee means that the investigator has to be able to interpret and document both the intentions of the suspect and the reaction of the victim. Unless there is a confession this process often results in the investigator dropping the case or needing to look for other evidence (i.e.: the suspect had a gun on him / her at the time) before a prosecutor will even look at the case. How can we expect investigators to enforce the law without a legally accepted psychological basis for evaluating the suspect’s intent or the victim’s reaction?

Behavior based threat assessments do create some legal issues themselves. Behavior based threat assessments combine both intelligence operations with criminal investigations. FPS has an obvious need for both and recent legal findings have shown that FPS is within its authority to conduct intelligence operations concerning their mission separate from criminal
investigations (from the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties investigation in 2009). 

*Executive Order (EO) 12333 of 04 December 1981* provides that the Attorney General is primarily responsible for the collection of intelligence information within the United States and against United States citizens under only specific circumstances. Various other laws such as the *Patriot Act* and the *USA Patriot Improvement And Reauthorization Act of 2005* have restricted or enhanced certain types of intelligence operations but the laws concerning the separation between US citizens and non citizens stems from EO 12333. The Attorney General under specific direction allows the FBI to coordinate the collection of intelligence information against US citizens and all federal law enforcement authorities are required to coordinate such activities with the FBI. Generally this means is that if a crime has occurred, such as an individual made a threat, then FPS has the authority on its own to conduct a criminal investigation into the accusation. If no crime has been committed, and there is a general threat of violence against FPS protectees, then FPS can continue to investigate to determine whether another crime has been committed or must coordinate with the FBI to conduct an intelligence operation to understand the potential threat if no crime is or has occurred.

Lastly, because many behavior based threat assessments involve mental health professionals, there are generally concerns regarding the access to information and the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act* (HIPAA). This was addressed specifically by the USSS as part of the development of their behavior based threat assessment processes and would have to be addressed at some point by FPS. USSS has determined that timely access to such information was based more on relationships and mutual understanding of the use of the information then on legal authority.
Threat Assessments

Article after article concerning directed or targeted violence explains that traditional policing strategy and capabilities are ill equipped to manage violence that has not yet happened. There is occasionally a public outcry against local police organizations because they failed to stop a specific violent crime usually involving a child. There may be a task force created or a crackdown in similar crimes for a period of time, but the fact remains that law enforcement is designed to respond reactively and not proactively to crimes, even violent crimes. There is little training available and little to no assistance from the courts in management of a crime that has not yet happened. Most agencies arrest the individual for a more petty crime, such as disorderly conduct, warn the individual from any further action, place restraining orders or if serious enough place the potential victim, not the offender, in protective custody or victim / witness protection programs. Dr. Fein summarizes the difference in *Threat Assessment: An Approach To Prevent Targeted Violence*, published in the National Institute of Justice, as:

The primary responsibility of law enforcement professionals is to determine whether a crime has been committed, conduct an investigation to identify and apprehend the perpetrator, and gather evidence to assist prosecutors in a criminal trial. However, when police officers are presented with information and concern about a possible future violent crime, their responsibilities, authority, and investigative tools and approaches are less clear. (Fein, pg. 2, 1995)

The ability to perform a timely, accurate and pertinent assessment of the potential risk is extremely important to both the agency and the victim. The hope is not to postpone the attack but to remove the suspect, not the victim, from the critical path they are on, thus removing the need for the reactive response to the violence.

Most law enforcement organization seems to not understand the difference between making threats and posing a threat. The classic example of domestic violence demonstrates the
regular inability for law enforcement to manage future violence. Most local officers are required by policy to arrest one of the individuals, arrest the male, or use his/her discretion as to whether or not the individuals can stay together. This decision is made within minutes and with little to no background information other than the officer’s personal experience, education, and any information in the local criminal databases. Immediately before the officer’s arrival both parties could have been screaming death threats at each other, but now that the officer is there they both say they are fine and just needed to settle down. In some cases this is true but in others the officer leaves and comes back to more disturbances or much worse crimes. The only way for officers to make informed decisions about the risk posed is by understanding the threat assessment process and understanding that not all threats are carried out, and not all violence was predicated by a threat. The Exceptional Case Study Project conducted by the US Secret Service showed that out of 83 incidents the suspect(s) either carried out an assassination attempt or planned to assassinate a public figure, only 4% had ever communicated a direct threat to the target. However, 63% had a “history of indirect, conditional, or direct threat about target” directed to somebody other than the target (USSS, pg 7, 1999).

The Exceptional Case Study Project suggests a use of Critical Path to Violence (CPV) for better understanding how close a suspect is to committing to an act of violence. In The Path To Terrorist Violence: A Threat Assessment Model For Radical Groups At Risk Of Escalation To Acts Of Terrorism Mr. Dean Olson, in his thesis published by the Naval Post Graduate School’s Center for Homeland Security, explores the use of CPV in assessing potential violence from radical groups. Mr. Olson explains that CPV is simply using behavior to assess the psychological path that an individual moves along towards an act of violence. According to Olson most if not every person that commits pre-planned acts of violence must go through this
critical path to find their actions acceptable and just (Olson, 2005, 7). Olson cited research by James W. Clarke in 1981 who studied the psychopathology of the perpetrator’s thoughts instead of the relationship between their actions and mental illness. Clarke was the first to understand the “situational approach to predicting political dangerousness’ by noting behaviors and actions common to assassins” (Olson, 2005, 7). By identifying the behaviors critical to an assassins actions Clark and then Olson were able to predict by future physical behaviors and previous psychological states required to get to the behaviors shown. Clark’s research allowed for the USSS to identify assassins based upon their behavior (which is much more readably observable and reliable) and then the psychology of a plan of attack. Olson was able to adopt the CPV theory developed by Calhoun into a graphic representation of the 5 phases needed as part of the path to violence and their relationship to both criminal activity and risk of attack. The phases of psychological development that result in specific behavioral outputs include Grievance, Ideation, Research & Planning, Preparation, Breach and lastly Attack. For purposes of this research and its application within FPS we will focus on Grievance through Preparation. However, this does not preclude investigating the prior levels by agents or officers who identify an attack based on other training.

Olson describes in detail the relationship between each phase and its relationship to radical groups and points out that the time it takes to travel between phases or along the entire path is irrelevant and could be hours or years (Olson, 2005, 13). ((In this application there has
not been much study of the application of each phase against a generic application of the federal government. This makes no sense to me). However a combination of research from the USSS, US Capital Police, US Marshals Service and researchers such as Olson provide a very strong overall picture of the anticipated behaviors as the research conducted in all of these organizations is to protect a more specific section of the federal government.

_Grievance_

Having a clear, understandable grievance according to Crenshaw is the first step in developing the psychology needed to attack the federal government. Humans do not in general perform violent acts without a reason. Generally these reasons are psychologically understandable even if the majority of society would not act the same based on a similar grievance. Having a thorough understanding of the grievance and how important the grievance is to the individual or group will help investigators to understand the willingness to act out violence (Olson 2005, 24).

_Ideation_

Ideation is the point where the individual or group starts to rationalize separately from other more socially acceptable ways of managing grief. At this point the individual or group starts to distance themselves morally. The theory of Crisis of Legitimacy helps identify the change from Grievance to Ideation and explains the reasons that individuals use language that depersonalizes their enemy as part of their threatening behavior. This helps to further plans by weighting more heavily the values of the individual or group over, in this case, the government. In order to do this an individual or group must reject the legitimacy of the government over
themselves and will make statements to that affect (Sprinzak, 1991, 50). This is further supported by research that showed that group rhetoric concerning a higher morality was a significant indicator of potential violence (Smith, 2004, 418). Often times this ideation is described in written threats, journals or on web sites and blogs. Because of the degree of separation between societal norms and the ideation there is often another person or group that is supporting the ideation. Individual with a clear grievance who also identify themselves with these types of organizations would be of extreme concern to FPS. However, it is not illegal to be aggrieved, to associate yourself with such organizations or speak out against the government.

Since higher risk agencies, such as Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, Environmental Protection Agency, etc…, report many of the threats to FPS, it is also important to realize that those agencies also had a relationship with the individual or group prior to the grievance. Changes in behavior around the time of the grievance can be strong indicators of the transition to Ideation. The next phase, Research & Planning, is not only where illegal activity begins but also where the individual or groups actions become much more observable.

**Research & Planning**

After an individual has embraced violence as an acceptable and possible answer to their grievance, then the individual may begin to plan out how they would perform their attack. Planning can vary in length of time but requires certain predicable behaviors. This is the first point where a suspect’s intentions maybe detected because the research the aggrieved must conduct prior to an attack that forces the individual to come into in-direct and direct contact with the target, . Behaviors would include, at a minimum, requests for information, observation of target, search of public records, stalking type behavior and / or questioning of individuals that
know the target. The records of this type of research may be kept in journals, safes, private areas or published on websites or very public venues. Olson uses a quote from the website of the Animal Liberation Front to demonstrate the Research & Planning phase:

You can install all of the motion sensor lights in the world and it won't make a difference. You've been marked. …We've been in your house while in San Francisco. We've 'bumped' into you at Costco. You've given us the time while in line at Bank of America. We've been watching you and your family. (Olson 2005, 31)

Interviews of individuals associated with the target may have also noticed suspicious activity which could be indicators of research. It is also important to note that in the provided example the locations where information was collected where only partially at the workplace and were primarily collected at a place of residence and in the community. This is important for FPS as there has been a long standing confusion of where the authority of certain law enforcement officer resides and what the nexus to the federal government is. In the above example, if the researcher was a federal employee and the attack planned for federal property, then the suspect’s collection of information at the bank and Costco has a clear nexus to the threat against federal property.

The evolution of the individual’s progress along the CPV is important at this point because of several reasons. First this shows the psychological progress the individual has made towards an attack and that they are now willing to risk being caught while trying to carry out their plans. Secondly, the use of criminal activity to meet their goal means that law enforcement can legally start to collect criminal investigative information and maintain information against the individual or group. Prior to this point civil rights protection, as explained in the Legal Concerns of Investigating Threats section of this document, limit information gathering against individuals and groups from law enforcement intelligence operations. However, if criminal activity is suspected as part of a potential attack, then FPS has the full legal authority to
investigate those crimes and their relationship to the future attack. Ideally, since the government is the one seen as being at fault to the aggrieved, as in most FPS cases, then it seems that the agencies involved would want to mitigate the threat of violence as soon as possible. However, there is blurring between the Grievance and Ideation that leads to violence which could make a mitigation strategy difficult to enforce between agencies. The ability to determine the seriousness of the potential attack does not appear until the Research & Planning phase has started.

Preparation

Preparation generally goes beyond just obtaining or building a weapon and may include practice runs, final act behaviors, and other outwardly less meaningful criminal activity. As an example in the Springfield, IL federal courthouse potential attack thwarted by the FBI the suspect was stopped by local law enforcement for speeding within minutes of the dry run as he was “fleeing the city”. The suspect’s vehicle was impounded due to an expired driver’s license and an FBI confidential informant had to pick up the suspect to drive him home. Final act behaviors may include grooming or costuming, putting affairs in order or documenting final thoughts and reasons for violence. Many of these behaviors are also of a more public nature that is possibly detectable by law enforcement. At this point the risk of violence is extreme and the danger to the public is significant.

Breach

The Breach is often seen as the beginning of the attack and is where the suspect puts themselves or their weapon within proximity to the target. The Transportation Security
Administration uses sophisticated screening equipment and the Behavior Detection Officer program to screen passenger flights for potential attackers that are at the Breach phase of the CPV. The only way to detect the behavior at this point is to identify individuals that are exhibiting behaviors associated with extreme amounts of stress or detecting the weapon. Multiple studies have been conducted on this type of behavior and FPS is working on several strategies to improve detection efforts at the security screening check points that would work in conjunction with CPV and be mutually supportive.

Chapter Summary

After decades of research trying to connect violence with mental illness, social / family issues or biological deformities the prevailing theory is that violence is much more complicated than previously thought. The true reason for violence is a combination of many factors and because of the number of variables and the information needed to understand each variable, law enforcement may never be able to use the “reason for violence” to predict future violence. In the absence of this type of research has shown that it is more helpful to utilize the Critical Path to Violence (CPV) model in determining whether an individual is moving towards violence. This analysis of behaviors allows for law enforcement to understand the psychology of the suspect and their relationship with the victims without a full psychological analysis. CPV has shown to have substantial application within federal law enforcement including the US Secret Service, US Capital Police and US Marshals Service. As any new program there are always concerns for the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) implementation of a CPV program but the precedence has been set, at this point primary need is in the use of applied research to create a CPV that is specific to FPS’s protective mission. With this ability FPS will better be able to mitigate threats
and provide a more detailed account of the facts to assist the US Attorneys in prosecuting cases where a suspect has threatened the US Government.
Chapter 3

METHOD

The research was conducted in conjunction with the Federal Protective Service / Department of Homeland Security out of Denver, Colorado. The literature review identified several similar research projects conducted by private, scholarly organizations in conjunction with the US Secret Service (USSS). Their model was to develop research questions, question pertaining to psychology, behavior and the investigative process used to investigate the crimes and then analyze the research results and use those results to identify opportunities for growth within the USSS. Due to the lack of resources and the inability to access entire case files this method had to be modified to include only publically available information.

The research questions that have been identified for this project include: How do attackers develop the idea of targeting the federal government? What motivates people to act violently towards the federal government? How are targets selected? What types of violence are used to attack the federal government? What relationship is there between threats and violence in regards to FPS protectees? What relationship exists between mental illness and violence in regards to FPS protectees? What is the critical path to violence for attacks against the federal government? How can the critical path to violence be disrupted to prevent or mitigate potential attacks?

The research questions were used to evaluate the relevance of each of the case studies used to ensure that the case studies examined provide substantial evidence either in supportive of or against a psychological progression that can be demonstrated through the use of a behavioral
analysis program. These case files include information derived from both public and non-public sources to include the media, court filling, law enforcement bulletins, reports and case studies. Based on the similarities of intent and the anticipated critical path being similar to what was created by the Exceptional Case Study Project by the USSS similar variables were used.

The information was collected, organized and analyzed in conjunction with a Regional Intelligence Agent from the Federal Protective Service to ensure that information is being analyzed with the goal of protecting life and federal property. This Special Agent has several years of experience working as a federal law enforcement officer responsible for investigating threats against federal property, has extensive experience in working with various other law enforcement organizations in the protection of threatened property or persons and has been educated on the scholarly research procedures and application.

10 cases that clearly were the responsibility of the FPS, were analyzed. All cases had been investigated in the last 20 years, were directed against the United States federal government and either had resulted in an attack on the intended target or plans to attack the target. If the target was not attacked the plans to attack must have been refined to the point where the attack was imminent but interrupted by law enforcement. Each case is summarized in the Case Study section of the Results chapter of this document. Analysis of the results was conducted and this information was used to create various training aids and a professional recommendation for changes to the Protective Investigation Program (PIP).

Chapter Summary

As the research has shown by the US Secret Service (USSS) the application of the use of a Critical Path to Violence (CPV) methodology to measure behavior could provide the Federal Protective Service a well defined tool which helps investigators to analyze a specific threat. The need for scholarly, peer reviewed research as part of this process (within the USSS’s research)
has created an opportunity for large amounts of information to be made publically available and useful in determining the specifics to the CPV. Use of research questions to define variables of interests and then evaluation of those interests by the development of cases studies was well received by both criminologists and psychologists. A basic analysis of the results and the development of training aids were instrumental in helping the USSS to develop organizational changes that assisted them in meeting their goals and effectively carry out their mission. Similar research methods and application strategies will help to solve the problem FPS faces in mitigating the threats of directed violence.
Chapter 4
RESULTS

Research Questions

How do attackers develop the idea of targeting the federal government? What motivates people to act violently towards the federal government? How are targets selected? What types of violence is used to attack the federal government? What relationship is there between threats and violence in regards to FPS protectees? What relationship exists between mental illness and violence in regards to FPS protectees? What is the critical path to violence for attacks against the federal government? How can the critical path to violence be disrupted to prevent or mitigate potential attacks? These research questions were used to define the applicability of the below case studies to the FPS investigative process and the potential use of behavioral analysis.

Case Studies

Cases studies are helpful in analyzing the particulars of an incident or a series of incident without having to document all of the facts of the case. These case studies are designed to research the relationship between the attacker and their individual Critical Path to Violence (CPV). Each case study starts with an introduction then discusses the relationship of known information regarding behaviors associated with the CPV and lastly any other impact the investigation had the behavioral analysis research. Information from these cases studies was only obtained from publically available information and other information may be available from the various law enforcement organizations that better document the relationship to CPV and the
attacks. Only cases where a “successful” attack occurred was used to demonstrate the result of violence.

Timothy McVeigh

The case study of Timothy McVeigh is of extreme importance to the federal government because of the implications of the attack. The Oklahoma City Bombing prompted an evolution in the methodology used to secure federal property. However, all of the changes involved the assessment process and countermeasure use in the mitigation of specific threats. For example most federal buildings and courthouses now are built with a standoff distance of at least 50 feet between a vehicle barrier and the exterior of the building. This ensures that a blast from a vehicle born improvised explosive device dissipates enough force prior to the blast hitting the building and that the blast does not cause structural collapse, unlike what happen at the Alfred P Murrah building.

There is a good amount of public information available and many cases studies have been done to examine the psychology behind McVeigh’s attacks. McVeigh had a clear fascination with weapons and special force tactics. While in the military McVeigh tried to join Special Forces but his psychological evaluation showed McVeigh would not be well suited for the job (Dugan, 2006; PBS, 1995). McVeigh had a generic grievance against the government to include issues with taxes and gun rights until the incidents at Ruby Ridge and then in Waco, TX with the Branch Davidians. These two incidents McVeigh saw as direct assaults by federal agents on the Constitutional rights of citizens and that the violation of their rights resulted in the death of innocent bystanders. McVeigh moved around extensively (nearly transient) and did not
associate with much other than the gun shows and gun rights activists. Several old military buddies moved in and out of his life including Terry Nichols. Nichols possibly had communications with Ramsey Yousef which provided further ideation. It is unclear how much time McVeigh spent planning his attack but it is known that he purchased components for the bomb over several months from multiple states. There was no need to breach the secure area and the attack happened as McVeigh had planned. During the court proceedings McVeigh explained that the death of the 19 children in the building was considered collateral damage and that if he had known about the children he might have picked a different method of attack.

**Andrew Stack**

In February of 2010 Andrew Stack was extremely upset with the IRS after years of battles over unpaid taxes. Stack wrote a manifesto detailing his feelings and explaining the reason for his follow on actions. Stack then lit a fire at his home and then flew a small plane into the IRS office in Austin, TX. As this case is substantially newer than the Oklahoma City Bombing there is not as much public information available, accept the manifesto written by Stack prior to his death.

When reading through the manifesto Stack clearly had a specific grievance which he had tried to resolve multiple times over several years. Stack had several communications with several family and friends about his frustration with the IRS leading up to the attack. Even though there was not a clear individual or group that supported his ideation prior to the attack, there was an obvious attempt to seek indirect approval for his potential violence. Several reports after the attack cited Stack’s daughter calling Stack a hero for his antigovernment motivations. Most of Stack’s preparation was related to his writing of the manifesto. According to Business
Insider Stack made 27 changes to his manifesto over 2 days. Stack finished his manifesto at 11:42 pm the day prior to the attack (Business, 2010). There was no public information regarding Stack’s choice of using an aircraft other than he was a pilot and had access to the aircraft. The breach and attack happened at the same time. Two people were killed and 13 injured.

Johnny Wicks

In January of 2009 Johnny Wicks became so mad at the Social Security Administration (SSA) that he set his Las Vegas home on fire and then went to the Federal Courthouse where the SSA office was and shot and killed a Court Security Officer. After firing multiple shots into the building Wicks fled the area but was chased across the street by deputies from the US Marshals Service where he was shot and killed.

According to ABC News who interviewed the family of Wicks he was upset with the SSA due to his disability payments being reduced and a law suit against the SSA being dismissed (ABC, 2009). As part of that law suit Wicks had claimed that he was racially discriminated against by the SSA. Wicks clearly had a grievance which he had attempted to fix through legal actions (Wicks Lawsuit). Wicks had an extensive criminal history which may have decreased the need for an ideation period. No public information has been available to determine any other factors regarding Ideations or the Research and Planning phases. Setting his house on fire is a classic “last act” behavior generally associated with the Preparation Phase. Wicks waited outside of the courthouse for a short period and then entered the courthouse as the courthouse opened.
Wicks did not make it past the security but did breach the envelope of the building before retreating to the streets where he was shot and killed.

**Abdulhakim Muhammad**

The case of Abdulhakim Muhammad is of extreme interest to this research as he is the attacker that affiliated himself with an international terrorist organization. Muhammad was born and raised in the United States but renounced his family, changed his name and moved to Yemen. While in Yemen he was detained by the Yemen authorities on charges of supporting terrorism, was interviewed by American authorities and then deported back to the United States. Within several months of being back Muhammad attacked the US Military recruiter’s office in Little Rock, AR. After being arrested Muhammad wrote the judge asking for the death penalty, stating that he was of a sound mind and believed his actions justified according to Islamic law.

Muhammad’s conversion to Islam happened in college and previous to that he had a case that was dropped for both weapons and drug charges. As part of his conversation to an extremist Islam Muhammad started attending a mosque that was frequented by other known terrorists. In 2007 Muhammad traveled to Yemen where he studied Arabic and married a Muslim woman. While in Yemen he reportedly studied at the Damaj Institute which is the same school John Walker Lindh (shoe bomber) studied while overseas. Clearly due to Muhammad’s associations there was a clear tendency to violence based on the ideation of the group. Even though Muhammad told investigators after the fact that he did not plan the attack but he did attempt to buy the weapons in the hopes to be able to conduct an attack. After being successfully Muhammad reportedly studied several potential targets including three separate recruiter
stations. As Muhammad drove by the Little Rock, AR recruiter’s office he saw two soldiers outside smoking. He pulled up to the soldiers and started shooting (NEFA, 2009). Even though there was not a clear plan for a specific target there was a clear planning and preparation phase for an unknown attack. Having the rifle and not needing to breach the security perimeter was the crime of opportunity which was facilitated by the behaviors associated with the CPV.

Also of interest to this research is the interaction between Muhammad and the FBI. Due to the nature of his deportation back to the US the FBI had several interactions with Muhammad overseas and in the US attempting to determine his affiliation with terrorists. The FBI was not able to obtain the information they needed to obtain a wire tap or put Muhammad under surveillance. However, had they used a behavioral analysis program they may have been able to show the courts that the behaviors indicate likelihood to commit an act of violence. The information obtained by the FBI was never publically released, however it is unlikely that a behavior analysis was completed which may have provided the information needed for more significant monitoring (NEFA, 2009).

*Michael C. Finton*

The case of Michael Finton was also extremely important to this research as it was extremely well documented by the FBI as they were able to introduce a confidential informant (CI) early into the investigations. Finton was introduced by a friend to a CI who was posed as an Al Qaeda operative recruiting terrorists from the US. Through the progression of several meetings Finton proposed a plan to the CI and an undercover FBI agent to blow up the Springfield, IL Federal Courthouse. The FBI and ATF provided a vehicle with a fake bomb and
Finton drove the bomb to the building and attempted to detonate it. Even though the attack was not real Finton was unaware of this making his demonstrated behavior from the begging through to the attack extremely valuable to the federal government.

According to the review that the Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation (NEFA) conducted using various court documents and news reports. Finton was arrested for armed assault and robbery in 1999 and was converted to Islam in prison. Finton was described by a local paper as being extremely anti-American due to the letters to the editor that Finton would submit which focused on Islam and the oppression of the Muslims. Finton traveled to Saudi Arabia but it is unclear if this trip was to further radicalize Finton. After being introduced to the CI Finton made statements expressing his wish to fight jihad and that he would rather die as a martyr then live in the US. Finton requested to seek training and then was introduced to the undercover agent. As Finton’s frustration grew with not being trained Finton suggest that he could attack a target in the United States. Clearly Finton had a grievance and believed in his specific ideation against the United States. Finton believed he needed the appropriate training, equipment and knowledge to be able to commit the attack. Finton’s willingness to attack the federal courthouse was based on the symbolism of the courthouse and the proximity to several political leader’s offices across the street. After several months of meetings and a dry run the FBI provided Finton the fake bomb. There was no breach necessary, however the vehicle was parked in a no parking zone. After retreating several blocks Finton attempted to remote detonate the bomb twice prior to being arrested.

Finton’s recorded conversations which are transcribed in the court documents clearly show all phases of the CPV and the need for them to be displayed in the specific order.
The arrest and conviction of Matthew Fraticelli is likely the most interesting and unique of the cases examined in that Fraticelli did not have an explainable grievance. According to court documents, Fraticelli plead guilty to creating an unregistered explosive device. Fraticelli explained that he had made a bomb out of a mini keg and placed it at the federal courthouse without lighting the fuse. Fraticelli denied targeting any specific person or the courthouse in general. Even though there was no known Grievance phase, there is evidence of the other phases. As Fraticelli had a previous conviction for the same charge directed at a non-federal entity, it is logical that at some point there was a period of ideation where Fraticelli came to the understanding that building explosives was morally acceptable. There was a clear phase of Research & Planning as Fraticelli admitted to scouting out a location the month prior and also need time and materials to build the bomb. The Breach phase was not necessary as the bomb was placed outside of the secure area but would have caused damage within the secure area if it had gone off. Fraticelli did not light the fuse and thus the attack never occurred. The lack of actual violence may demonstrate that even though Fraticelli believes it ok to build bombs that he has not psychologically committed himself to needing violence to alleviate a grievance. This would further explain the lack of grievance and unclear period of ideation and so would not be considered an act of directed violence. The Fraticelli case further supports that behavioral analysis and the Critical Path to Violence can be used to assess dangerousness as Fraticelli did not act out the violence because of a lack of grievance. Lastly, if you consider the Fraticelli case as violent based on the potential of violence it would be of random violence, which has a completely separate psychological basis then targeted or directed violence, which is the study of this project.
Research Limitations

There were several research problems that for future research must be addressed as part of the research design. The first is for this project the definition of cases that were analyzed versus not being analyzed was not all encompassing. The USSS was able to include any case that they defined as posing a credible threat to the protectee because the individual either was going to or attempted to conduct the attack. Since FPS has such a large number of cases where the dangerousness is questionable there was no possible way, with the resources available, to provide for a comprehensive analysis. Furthermore, since much of the background questions for CPV are not currently being asked, unless the case went to court or received a large amount of media exposure there was no way for the researcher to identify the appropriate response to the majority of the variables. This could be resolved by adopting the CPV model and addressing the questions for each phase so that future researchers would have this information available to them.

Additional research limitations include the lack of control groups (as law enforcement cannot let the violence happen if they know about it), the sheer quantity of variables and the use of indirect sources. The use of indirect sources is the only research limitation that could be removed by having the researcher also performs the functions of the investigating agent as the USSS did. The researcher not being an agent limited the amount of information that was available.

Additional Research Ideas

In researching the application of CPV within FPS there were several other research topics that were identified that could of great value to FPS. These included: Partnership with AUSA and Mental Health Professionals to better understand each other’s roles in mitigating threats,
functions of Behavior Based Threat Assessment in organizational or societal sub groups, development of a FPS specific CPV assessment of suspects of directed violence, study factors influencing agents’ judgment in evaluating risk of directed violence, and lastly study the legal, social and cultural factors that affect risk mitigation strategies within FPS.

Chapter Summary

There are multiple examples of how a behavioral analysis program would allow FPS to make a more informed decision about the progression of an individual to an act of violence and assist investigators in determining the most appropriate mitigation strategies. Use of case studies can be used as an appropriate method for determining the applicability of a behavioral analysis program and to measure the effectiveness of these programs after implemented. Use of a behavioral analysis program does require senior leadership to address some problems to include the access of information for researchers, the introduction and use of the behavioral analysis as a uniform tool for investigation of all cases involving directed violence and additional research into the variables that would be determined to be most valuable for both research and investigation.
Chapter 5

DISCUSSION

The combination of the above research with the cases studies provides a clear need for a behavioral analysis program within the FPS and demonstrates the applicability of these types of programs in other law enforcement organizations which have a protective mission.

FPS Critical Path to Violence

One of the primary goals of the research was to understand whether there is a relationship between the US Secret Service’s behavior based threat assessment models and directed violence against FPS protected properties. There is a clear and direct correlation between the Critical Path to Violence (CPV) theories and the behaviors displayed prior to attack in the case studies of FPS protected properties. With a clearly discernable Grievance, Ideation, Research & Planning, Breach & Attack phases in most incidents. There were no other potential phases identified. There was a strong increase in dangerousness, risk and criminal activity as each phase of the CPV was reached.

Time Frame Of Progression Down CPV

There does not appear to be any regular pattern associated with the CPV and the amount of time it takes an individual(s) to progress through the CPV. There are too many psychological variables to be able to predict how close to violence an individual is; however there does seem to
be some acceleration from the Research & Planning Phase to the Attack Phase in comparison to the time it takes to go from the Grievance Phase to the Research & Planning Phase. It seems to be logical that if the grievance continues to happen or is perceived to be repeated after the Ideation Phase then this could provide psychological support to the need for violence, thus speeding up the need to act out.

Possible Mitigation Strategies

Ideally mitigating the threats at the Grievance Phase would provide the strongest likelihood and ability to change the psychological conditions that lead to progression down the CPV. Unfortunately detecting the severity of the issues at this point is nearly impossible and ultimately not the role of FPS. Since FPS’s mission is twofold, one to respond to crime and the other to prevent crime, FPS’s involvement is limited until between the Ideation Phase and the Research & Planning Phase. FPS’s goal with the use of CPV would not be to prevent the grievance but rather to get the suspect back on a more socially accepted cycle of managing the grievance or limiting the individual’s ability to progress down the CPV. In order to be able to detect the evolution from ideation to planning an attack, requires the participation of not only FPS but also the protectees themselves. For this reason the most important role FPS plays in the mitigation of directed violence is in the initial assessment. In order to affectively be able to evaluate the risk FPS must develop a relationship with the protectees, have a defined process for collecting and evaluation risk related information, and have a plan for acting on that information. Specific details currently include or may include:
• Developing Relationships – Many protectees do not see the threat as credible and so unless told to report specific activities through training and professional relationships then the incidents go unreported. Training must be pertinent to the job the protectee performs and in support and cooperation with their leadership. More advanced training must be provided to supervisors with the emphases on asking questions and reporting potential incidents. Training should stress that government employees who work with the public are not required to be harassed or assaulted as part of their work and that this behavior must be reported. Training should also encourage employees to pay attention to their surroundings and ask questions. Lastly Inspectors, Agents, Area Commanders and even Protective Security Officers should develop strong, professional relationships with the protectees to build mutual trust and respect which will facilitate more timely reporting of incidents. In general FPS must practice the Community Policing Methodologies to build stronger relationships. The current FPS provided Security Awareness Training provides for many of these functions but is inconsistently provided.

• Initial Evaluation – The USSS did several studies on the variables that affected agent’s ability to evaluate the risk associated with directed violence. The current PIP program and policies provide for a broad response to threats but does not require the investigator to collect specific information which validates or disproves the threat. Generally the initial contact with the individual is the only contact and is prefaced by very basic information. These contacts often result in a letter from FPS to the suspect explaining the criminal implications of further harassing or threatening actions. However, there is often little to no attempt in understanding the reasons for the behavior or how the behavior
identified can be mitigated. In a simple line of questioning FPS could identify whether the behavior that first drew the attention of FPS was a result of the suspect being on the CPV. Without this evaluation there is no ability for FPS to evaluate the need for further action until after another crime has happened.

- **Plan For Action** – Lastly, FPS needs a plan for how to manage suspect that are identified to be progressing down the CPV to all levels. This might include case management, criminal proceedings, psychological assessments, facilitating conversations between the suspect and the government or routine meetings with the suspect. Many of these have legal challenges and requirements but the precedence that the USSS has set clearly provides the ability for FPS to work with suspects in non criminal arenas to mitigate threats.

**Documenting Dangerousness For Court Proceedings**

If non court related mitigation strategies are not appropriate or do not work then FPS may have to file criminal charges against suspects of directed violence. The CPV process helps FPS in documenting these cases as it provide a basis for the reasons behind the directed violence and the potential for additional violence if there is no intervention. Often threat cases become a he said / she said in front of the courts. With a well documented case file which includes the reasons for the behavior, the behavior demonstrated, the FPS actions to help the suspect to refocus their behavior, and the support information needed to make those decisions provides a thorough picture of the situation. This also provides the courts the ability to provide other interventions as part of a sentence to include mandatory psychological treatment, restraining
orders and for supervised release after incarceration. These all provide FPS added ability to track the behavior through the criminal justice process to ensure that the suspect is not becoming more dangerous due to the courts actions and just delaying the violence.

Recommendations

Based on the research, the following recommendations are made to the FPS as part of the development of a behavioral analysis program.

_Potential Policy Changes_

The current focus in protecting government employees is in the generic Comprehensive Risk Assessment prior to a specific threat maker being known and then the Protective Investigations Program (PIP) once a threat maker has been identified. The policy requires an immediate investigation and determination of the risk within set time frames but does not provide the guidelines for the evaluation. The PIP needs to be expanded to include issues that make the risk higher or lower and how that information is to be obtained. To do this the USSS developed tools that provide agents uniform, clearly understandable, question / answer type documents which allow an agent to follow the defined behavior based assessments from start to finish, such as the CPV. Once a section of the PIP describes the use of behavior based assessments then the appropriate actions should also be defined. These actions should include voluntary and non-voluntary psychological counseling, criminal charges, verbal and written warnings, undercover surveillance, use of undercover officers and informants. The remainder of the document is thorough and comprehensive.
Additional Training

Law enforcement personnel should be provided adequate training on the use of behavior based threat assessments to ensure that the risk is being measured accurately and that the mitigation techniques are affective. Both initial training and recurring training should stress the importance of using CPV as a tool to identify questions that need answered and as a method for documenting the risk for future action. Behavior based assessments is not all that different from what agents already do, but instead of acting on ‘instinct’ there needs to be an ability for the agent to describe the behavior and the significance of that behavior. At the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) many of their training program regarding use of force require the officers to be able to understand their perception of the circumstances and to be able to describe it adequately. Investigators are encouraged to describe in great detail why they would or did use force. For example, the suspect clenched his teeth / fist, swore at me, threatened me, hit other objects, rolled up his sleeves, bladed me, would not remove his hands from his pockets, etc… Agents must understand that CPV is simply a tool that investigators use to document the behaviors they are seeing (prior to the violence) and why those are important to the totality of the circumstances. With CPV the actions may not be as clear but are just as relevant to the investigators ability to protect the potential victims.

Creation of a Behavioral Analysis Unit

As the US Secret Service developed this model they found that a partnership between psychologists, the courts, mental health professionals and law enforcement was greatly beneficial to their protective operations. Out of this partnership developed the National Threat Assessment Center which is tasked with assisting in the use and development of behavior based threat
assessments. FPS recognition of these types of partnerships and the critical role that they would play in the FPS protective mission would be best demonstrated by developing a Behavioral Analysis Unit which would have several functions that would support the use of the CPV.

Potential goals might include:

- To provide support to FPS inspectors, agents and leadership responsible for investigating threats in the areas of background investigation, psychology of threats, historical reference and trends regarding threats, other resources available for assisting in investigations and providing a national level coordination between FPS and other federal law enforcement organizations such as the National Threat Assessment Center.

- Research and analyze intelligence, information sharing channels, trends, case studies, potential resources, mitigation strategies, investigation strategies and other support information which assist FPS staff in investigating or mitigating threats to the federal government.

- Provide FPS, DHS and other partners with training, resources and expertise in the management and investigation of threats.

The practical uses of this type of program would include:

- To facilitates a faster response to threats by providing agents, inspectors and leadership with a clear picture of the likelihood of the threat materializing and the potential consequences based on a comprehensive background investigation (behavior based risk assessment) compared to historical indicators and mitigation strategies.
- To assist agents & inspectors with documenting threats by analyzing interviews of both suspects and victims to create a clear picture of the motives for the threat and the intentions for carrying out the threat. Provide psychological analysis of the state of mind of both the threat maker and the victims. Ensures a comprehensive analysis of each threat and case reviews provide feedback for agents & inspectors for professional growth.

- Research conducted by the team ensures that FPS is one of the premier agencies in the world regarding investigation of threats. This expertise would be used by senior leadership to make strategic decisions about response to threats, training and interaction with other federal law enforcement organizations.

- The team would provide FPS an unparallel, internal ability to analyze the effectiveness of the PIP program, make changes and provide training to FPS staff on the most current intelligence and investigative strategies.

- Provide expert witness consulting services to FPS cases regarding behavior based threat assessments, the CPV model, law enforcements interactions with mental health professionals and the non court related mitigation strategies.

Building an FPS Behavioral Analysis Unit:

- These teams often must be funded separately by Congress (such as the National Threat Assessment Center). If this developed into a national program that is widely used by the other agency then that might be necessary. However, on an agency level the possibilities could be explored in the same manner as the Secret Service started
the NTAC. The unit could be started by allowing a formal partnership between a university, the courts, the FPS intelligence operations and mental health professionals as an additional duty for 2 to 5 general crimes agents that are working across the country.

A team with strong partnerships, which strive for a better understanding of the behavior that leads to violence, would be a very strong asset that could shape the future of FPS in many ways. As FPS is not far from this ability the implementation expenses could be minimal in comparison to the current costs of investigating crimes without an ability to measure the effectiveness of the program, and the inherit risk that creates.

Chapter Summary

Hopefully the time, energy and resources vested in this project will be used to better protect the government, the people that use the government’s services and even the individuals that feel the need to make threats or attack the government. The CPV model has proven its ability to assist law enforcement organizations in determining the risk of specific threat makers and helps to identify the appropriate response to those risks. As FPS uses a similar Comprehensive Risk Assessment model to assess risk of generic threats, it makes logical sense that FPS would develop a program to measure the risk associated with specific threats. FPS needs a model that leverages both the criminal investigations and intelligence operations in a method that helps to identify the risk of each threat maker. FPS’s current inability to evaluate the risk associated with these threat makers and to develop a standardized response is alleviated by utilizing the behavior based threat assessments. The CPV model specifically would be of great value to FPS as it also supports both court related and non court related mitigation strategies for mitigating threats of directed violence. Even though this project did not have full
access to the information needed to validate the CPV model on a case by case basis there is strong evidence that this model could be applied easily, with a strong ability to measure its effectiveness and identify the best methods for mitigating the threats. There is a reason that many other federal law enforcement agencies are turning to this type of threat assessment; however, FPS not only has the ability to implement a similar program but more quickly increase the effectiveness of the program due to the large number of threats investigated by the agency.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES

1. Critical Path To Violence
2. Directed Violence Behavioral Analysis Quick Reference Guide
3. Example Training Power Point For Critical Path To Violence
This model of the Critical Path To Violence has been adopted from Olson, XXXX who adopted the original model from Calhoun 2001.
DIRECTED VIOLENCE BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS

Quick Reference Guide

Directed violence is any act that is committed by a person to harm a specific person or target, examples may include terrorism, threats, harassment and stalking. To be able to better understand and mitigate this type of violence the investigator must know the reasons behind the aggression. Due to the difficulty in prosecuting / mitigating these types of crimes this quick reference guide will help you to know which questions to ask and find answers to as you investigate crimes of directed violence. Think of this type of violence not as a single event but as a critical path that an individual choose to travel down that leads to violence. The psychological reasons are too difficult and variable to be easily explained; however the behavior displayed is almost always the same.

**Who** – Behavioral Analysis only works when having a suspect to investigate but does not require that an act of violence has happened or even that a threat has been made. If the suspect is not suspected of committing a crime then intelligence operations must be coordinated with FBI according to EO 12333. If there is no specific suspect but a crime has been committed then psychological profiling maybe of more help than Behavioral Analysis.

**Grievance** – All individuals that act out against a specific target have a reason that they either perceive or were legitimately traumatized, or somebody close to them being traumatized by something that the target represents to them. Generally the suspect either has tried to manage the grievance in another form or believes a group has tried all available options and had failed to alleviate the stress of the grievance.

**Ideation** – At some point the individual expressed interest in violence (not necessarily the exact attack) and felt they received support or did not receive condemnation for their views. With the internet being so prevalent this might be reassurance from anti government groups over the internet and direct contact is not necessary. Language of dominance, morality, justice and culture are strong indicators of ideation and maybe found in letters, blogs, ranting, threats or communication with confidants.

**Research & Planning** – This phase requires individuals to expose themselves to the target in order to retrieve information about the target. This is where stalking, harassment, inappropriate questioning and drawing of maps, taking photographs or requests for building plans is most likely to be seen. Suspects that are serious about their planning will have large amounts of both publically available and private information. Targets or individuals around the target may have noticed and even reported suspicious behavior. At this point is where the potential for violence becomes very serious to the target, generally unless stopped suspects that move past planning carry out their attack. At this point the suspect has committed both misdemeanor and felony level crimes such as conspiracy or threats, trespassing, harassment and privacy violations.

**Preparation** – Includes acquiring weapons, access to the target, transportation to and from the target, and may include dry runs or practice attempts. Suicidal individuals will perform final act behaviors such as destroying their personal property, killing pets, leaving letters for loved ones, selling valuables and personal grooming.

**Breach** – This is the last step prior to the attack and is the last possibility for law enforcement and security personnel to stop the attacker. Individual maybe overly protective, shy, sweating, and visibly nervous or many other behaviors that they are attempting to conceal their intent. Individuals found attempting to breach security with a weapon need to be considered very dangerous until a behavioral analysis can be conducted and the true intentions known.
Example Questions & Appropriate Actions

Below are questions and actions that investigators should know and perform prior to making decision regarding level of seriousness and potential consequences of risks associated with directed violence:

Who – Why was the subject brought to attention? Who reported what inappropriate behavior? Who is the subject, experience, education, status, experience with weapons, criminal history, physical / mental health issues? Interview family, friends, teachers, employers, religious leaders, peers. Search criminal investigative databases, speak with local law enforcement and mental health professionals.

Grievance – What is the person’s history of response to traumatic changes in life? Are there additional traumatic changes anticipated? Would a potential attack alleviate trauma? What is the likelihood of past life events that caused trauma recurring?

Ideation – Why is the subject interested in the target? How do others that know the subject view him / her in their environment? Does the subject day dream about the attack? Who is supporting the ideation? How is the subject’s ideation being supported? Does the suspect believe that the attack will bring about change to a specific cause? Does the suspect believe the attack would provide notoriety, monetary support or create a social change movement? Does the suspect want to die as part of the attack?

Research & Planning – What is the subject’s daily schedule? How much time do they devote to planning? How long have they been in the planning stages? What support have they received? Who are they working with? What information did he /she gain access to? How can that information be exploited? How does the suspect plan to carry out the attack? What is the time frame of the attack? Serve search warrant for planning documents, pictures & journals. Consider placing CI or undercover officer with suspect. Look for documentation that expresses unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel, entry points, access controls, perimeter barriers such as fences or walls. To include pictures / video from discreet or hidden angles, use of disguises for getting close to target such as pan handler, vendors or the media, multiple sets of identification, hand drawn sketches or site plans. Notes from observation of emergency / security drills or procedures. Unusual modes of transportation for suspect to get close to target.

Preparation – What is the subject’s familiarity with the target and its vulnerabilities. What is the sophistication of the potential attack. What “attack-related” behavior is present? Has the suspect purchased weapons? Conducted primary or secondary planning / surveillance? How organized is the subject, can they carry out the plan? Is what the subject saying corroborated by what they are doing? Serve search warrants for materials related to attack, guns, explosives, delivery mechanisms (vehicles), etc....

Breach – How well planned was breach? What were intentions of attack? How were weapons concealed? How many times has suspect gone through breach point? Are others involved? Detain suspect for crimes related to breaching, then attempt to answer above questions, search potentially compromised areas.

Risk Factors of Concern for Attack of Public Officials

Possession of: Handgun 51%, Rifle / Shotgun 30%, Explosives 8%

Goal: Harm of target 68%, Attention / notoriety 38%, Suicide 22%

History of Arrest: No history of arrest 34%, previous arrests as an adult for non violent offense 56%, previous arrest involving violence or a weapon 20 / 22%, only 22% served post conviction incarceration

Weapons Use / Interest (excluding military): regular use 71%, formal training 19%, fascination with weapons 38%

Mental State: at time of attack not delusional 57%, ever treated by mental health professional 61%, history of serious depression 44%, history of substance abuse 39%

Grievance: Towards target 57%, against a government agency 44%

Communication: Talked with others about attack 23%, showed interest in history of attacks 44%, communication about target 77%, communication with target 23%, History of indirect / conditional / direct threats about target 63%, Direct Threat to Target 4%

80% of attackers plan their attack

Due to the similarity of goals risk factors for attack on public officials maybe similar to risk factors for attack of government facilities. Risk Factors based on Exceptional Case Study Project, National Threat Assessment Center, US Secret Service.
Example Training Power Point For Critical Path To Violence

Critical Path To Violence
Behavioral Indicators Of Potential Violence Against Federal Property

Directed Violence
- Simply, violence that is directed at a specific target, generally for a specific reason or grievance
- Includes stalking, harassment, threats, workplace violence and terrorism

Based On Scholarly Research
- US Secret Service
  - Exceptional Case Study Project
  - National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC)
  - Better able to protect dignitaries
- Institute of Medicine (IOM)
  - Provides assessment of individuals who make threats
  - Study factors that influence agents decision making regarding risk of directed violence
  - Examined relationship between USSS and mental health professionals
  - Investigated impact of mental health law & policy on investigations

Exceptional Case Study Project
Statistical analysis of variables helps to define behaviors associated with the psychological condition that believes violence is justified
- 52% of attacks used handguns
- 68% of attackers wanted to harm target over receiving nastiness or avoidance
- 89% were males
- 77% were white
- 52% single & never married
- 63% had no children
- There was an even distribution of levels of education
- There was no noticeable correlation to education
- Only 20% had a previous arrest for a violent offense, but 68% had previously been arrested for a non-violent offense
- 75% of assault attackers were not excessive
- 63% had been treated by a mental health professional
- 97% had a grievance against the target
- 77% had communicated a threat to specifically other than the target
- Only 45% made a direct threat to target and then acted on it
- 53% were unemployed

Criminology & Psychology
- Profiling is the most commonly understood partnership and happens when a crime has occurred but there is no suspect
- Behavioral Analysis happens when you have a specific suspect, within a studied circumstance and some known variables
- Psychology & scholarly research are developing better methods for law enforcement solve cases
- Law enforcement uses psychological research to help researchers predict research hypothesis and prove theories
Behavioral Analysis For FPS

- Reverse engineering behavioral analysis helps FPS by "drawing a map" of where SA / Inspectors should look to address questions that must be answered to make decisions regarding the risk of directed violence.
- Behavioral Analysis:
  - Increases efficiency and accuracy of investigations
  - Provides a broader view to assess risk
  - Builds stronger partnerships between LE, attorneys & mental health professionals
  - Is proven by the US Secret Service
  - Helps determine the most appropriate mitigation strategies

Critical Path To Violence (CPV)

- Must have a suspect
- Must know how the suspect came to be suspected of directed violence
- If no criminal activity is suspected then must coordinate intelligence operations with FBI according to EO 12333 and US Attorney General Bulletins

Grievance

Ideation

As some point the individual expressed interest in violence (not necessarily the exact action) and why they received support or did not receive condemnation for their views. With the interest being so prevalent this might be reassurance from anti-government groups over the whether anti-direct contact is not necessary. Language of obedience, morality, justice and culture are strong indicators of ideology and may be based in letters, blogs, writing, threats or communication with confidants.
Research & Planning

Generally unless stopped suspects that move past planning carry out their attack. At this point the suspect has committed both misdemeanor and felony level crimes such as conspiracy or threats, intimidating, harassment and mischief violations.

This phase requires individuals to expose themselves to the target in order to retrieve information about the target. This is where criminal activity starts to expose itself such as stalking, harassment, dry runs, etc. Suspects that are serious about their planning will have large amounts of both publicly available and private information.

Preparation

Includes acquiring weapons, access to the target, transportation to and from the target, and may include dry runs or practice attempts. Suspects will perform final set behaviors such as dressing in their personal property, hiring pass, leaving letters for loved ones, selling valuables and personal grooming.

Breach

This is the last step prior to the attack and is the last possibility for law enforcement and security personnel to stop the attacker. Individuals may show signs of nervousness, anxiety, and visible signs of stress. They are attempting to plan their attack. Individuals found attempting to breach security with a weapon need to be considered very dangerous until a behavioral analysis can be conducted and the true intentions known.

Attack

The attack is the culmination of all the steps in the CPV and is the most dangerous and deadly criminal act.

Risk

Notice the increase of risk as the individual progresses through the CPV.

Criminal Activity

The need for criminal activity also increases as the individual progresses through the CPV.