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An Application of The Two Routes in Counseling Philosophy

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This is a case study of a session with a subject. The subject's name is *philosophy*. Philosophy needs a counseling intervention due to the development of an epistemological rupture revealing two routes into or upon knowledge. This problem that philosophy faces arises along two epistemological routes, called *truth* and *reality*. The significant issue of philosophy is how to reconcile a true reality. The proposal at hand for this consideration by philosophy is that a reconciliation is most effective through argumentative validation in *orientation* over argumentative proof in *ideological reduction*. Our effort here works toward the truth of reality found through validation, while also revealing in its course that the reality of truth suffers from a necessity for an argumentative reductive proof. However, the subject is resistant and generally myopic in its ability to reckon truth sensibly; thus, the proposal of orientation concerns more an ability to consider evidence of the rupture and less the argument to prove the rupture is epistemologically coherent. The intervention for the subject is to interrupt the processual manner that we shall term the real *conventional philosophical method*. This essay-as-intervention develops the theme through which the philosophical decree of subject material is negotiated as reality. The proposal is that by exposing philosophy to its basic and founding problem, we will find what it is, truly. We call the truth of the subject of the universe, the *object of the subject*.

KEYWORDS: *counseling, epistemology, new materialism, object-oriented ontology, object of the subject, philosophy, phenomenology, reality, The Two Routes, truth*

Orientation and Route

Please note: This essay is written in a style and manner that requires the reader to be challenged as to how the reader is indeed coming upon things, in this case, the essay itself. Some of my phrasings are specifically coupled to bring a moment of incredulity to the reader - so that the reader questions what the essay is actually saying. Moreover, to assist the reader in perhaps the process of coming upon what the essay is actually doing philosophically.

For philosophy to get anywhere; to be able to move, to be in process, to embody the motion it supposes of its arguments, it becomes obligated to align with the realization of the trouble it enacts. Like most subjects, philosophy cannot do this on its own; the phenomenology of philosophy always poses itself (as the process) complete because the phenomenon of incompleteness is neither innate nor recognizable to itself – that is, to philosophy. Philosophy is always philosophy, but it functions most often through a ‘philosophy of...’ Indeed, a proxy is needed if philosophy is to find/found itself in truth.

The issue at hand is that philosophy, as a practice and a principle - that is, as a *being* - while at times finding a problem, nonetheless and often enough sets the trouble aside for the sake of upholding itself unimpeachable. This is the issue of *orientation*. This is to say that philosophy holds something else besides itself responsible for its activity; conventional philosophy

understands itself as a name of a process of something else. This is the issue of philosophy, what is *being* counseled.

More precisely, the conventional philosophical orientation toward philosophy is not what it proposes itself to be but is rather a thing to be reckoned with outside of itself, for a term, *non-philosophically*. If we are to handle this situation and not be distracted away from this central issue by projections, reaction formations, distortions, emotional ejections, rationalizations, etc., the most appropriate manner through which to deal with philosophy is thus not to argue, but to bring out the trouble that lay in the method of argument itself (i.e. the conventional philosophical method).

In short, the exposure of this issue sheds light into how philosophy often works material and definition without ever confronting the material itself. Therefore philosophy, despite any definition of it and including every definition that can be made of philosophy, upholds a problem that it functions to hide. This is the single issue that serves to focus the efforts of Felix Guattari and Guiles Delueze, especially – and by no mere coincidence - *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. As well, the whole lineage of Continental philosophical efforts that have attempted to explicate or to otherwise make overt by long hand this epistemological lacuna. Through their works, in almost every instance, it is though this issue is not valid but merely a description of the entirety of what is able to be dealt with. This operational (manifestation) withholding and functional (processual) deferment is now the central problem of the subject of philosophy. The discovery or uncovering of what is denied, hidden, or missing of a subject is the basic assumption for the practicing of all mental health counseling. It is a philosophical issue.

The effort to focus on solutions aside (we will deal with this soon enough), before any other activity, as a practice, the counselor's role is to move into and stay with the trouble that arises unnoticed of a subject. As just described, yet to more clearly designate the issue involved, *conventional philosophy is the subject*, and in so much as this is what philosophy as a general principle method and practice enacts, the counselor, by holding space and focus, allows for the substance of the philosophical material to be recognized in-itself. The subject of philosophy thereby is no longer able to justifiably assert itself present as material, since this material is nothing but problem denied as an ideological jurisprudence, or, a method that is agreed upon; with somewhat more righteousness behind us, we might ask of what the constituency is made that is supporting this method. This is to ask: from where do an agreed upon ethics arise? The usual answer grants us even more trouble since something has been avoided in the deferring the issue of the subject to a philosophy that is, somehow, not linked to, subjectivity itself. Here is the infamous parallax gap elucidated in its many forms by Slavoj Zizek. This 'case study' taken in its form, as it is, thereby finds Jean-Francois Lyotard's work resonating in concert with Graham Harman's to allow us to say that the truth of the object of philosophy *is*, and by virtue of subjective methodology, perpetually withheld from all contemplation, and by extension, all relation.

To a subject that is enmeshed in its own righteousness, this can be a most upsetting proposal, and here we recall Soren Kierkegaard's report of the absurdity that there is no justifiable position to ethically make any leap of faith *from*; the leap of hope (faith) is already a conventionally proposing/proposed act. Our effort is not to abolish or correct any mistake; instead, the attempt itself is a reconciliation the existential discrepancy. Of course, leaps of faith happen all the time in the hopes that something beneficial or advantageous will arise.

The first steps in the therapeutic intervention thus include a simple exercise to note all the astonishment that arises for rebuttal, immediate dismissal, and rejection to the proposal that a subject can be an object, automatically and axiomatically in the activity of philosophy itself, in that this very phrase can be understood involved as a philosophical statement, a part of the subject

philosophy. We merely need note the implicit questioning that moves much of sensibility away from the absurdity of the meaning of such a proposal. This is exactly why philosophy, understood as a process (conventional philosophy's patsy), must be suspended in this effort to find the truth of the matter. This is the irony of modern subjectivity.

Further disconcerting for the modern enlightened mind, the suspension and pausing of the automatic intellectual giving-up upsets time itself. If we find ourselves in good therapeutic process, time effectively comes to a halt, at least momentarily, and the modern world, the assumed epistemology, is shaken to its core. This kind of jolt can be too much for a subject so sure of itself, and often the subject is triggered to fall back into an earlier philosophical stage, such as often happens when a rebuttal proceeds with "well, *x* said *y*"; in line with current therapeutic approaches to trauma - a backing-off is thus called-for. To bring the subject back into regulated space, we now clarify the project, since there is an easy noticing of problem to the 'stoic', intellectually incased, semantically discursive, and 'frozen' subject encountering anything at all in reality.

The subject of *what?* is a usual question. This kind of continuing methodological incredulity marks, less an intellectual possibility, and more an unreconciled, affective trauma at the heart of philosophy. Intellectual postures and attempts at justice, while appropriate to the trauma of the event, are highly reactionary and impulsive, and do little to help us move a world onward. Contrary to the conventional reductive application for solution in this case, which really serves to maintain the trauma through a habitual aggravating reenactment, a gentle tending, a move-in accompanied by a move-out when the energy becomes too much, helps the subject to move forward (Rothschild, 2020; Dana, 2018).

Reiteration and Re-approach

A true first philosophy demands first responders. One who moves toward, and into, the trouble. Counselors, by their very nature, are first responders. I am counseling philosophy. This is a case study of philosophy – of any and all philosophy to which is applied the term. By this, it is also an intervention. To some this may appear strange because I am not proposing to address a particular philosophical type or project (what I am calling "philosophy of..." philosophies, i.e. philosophy of language; philosophy of programming; philosophy of plant life; philosophy of space travel, philosophy of counseling, to name only a few) but rather I am understanding philosophy as a thing unto itself, a substantial subject, universal in its being, arising in the universe everywhere the term is used. Hence, to accomplish this odd task, first work must be done around an epistemologically amphibious situation that avoids a true grounding and that often blindly contributes to distress; philosophy as the name of a basic epistemological problem (subjectivity) yields a sign that the client is still in shock, attempting to solve and justify a problem outwardly that is nonetheless implicit, not only to its own existence, but again and again the universe itself. This is to indicate that the attempt to mitigate this highly activated subject in its effort of justice, to center and calm the subject floating in a body of ungrounded, eternally relative material, even to the extent to mechanize it to *be* entirely process, often serves only to maintain the aggravation - that is, the injustice. However unfortunate the situation is for those who see the proposal of this problem as untenable (i.e., philosophy of the problematized subject is not a valid problem in-itself but only a problem with reference to the material state of problem), it is not impossible but merely very difficult.

The client is in distress, and as an effective defense against a senseless event, denial is itself a most stubborn –although effective – ailment to overcome, never mind the problem the act of

denying poses to solve. Aggression and antagonism also work very well to keep the view off what is happening - a symptom of it. Most people understand philosophy as an analysis of content, so to suggest that it is philosophy itself that must be counseled is antithetical to what most people who think philosophically understand as philosophy. Thus, an astute kindness and pronounced grace are called for. The effort of this work must be to make progress toward a true reckoning of philosophical knowledge, of exposing the problem of just 'doing' philosophy. This is the problem of being philosophy itself.

The Rupture

My proposal is philosophy functions upon an epistemological rupture it actively works to hide, and as well, that the analysis and meaning of that which arises outside or in relief of this rupture is phenomenological. These two aspects constitute the true form of the subject; phenomenology is the manner through which truth may be found. The rupture is the notice of the rejection of problem philosophy. Therefore, the first issue in the way of addressing philosophy itself, as itself, is whether indeed the rupture is *noticeable*, able to be made notice of, and not whether it exists or is recognized philosophically. Subjects regularly are not able to notice what offends sensibility (i.e., the contradiction of meaning). Yet, oddly enough, philosophy regularly makes notice of a problem in order to find what matters. Hence, I make a clear distinction to say that what matters is real, while further clarifying *what needs counseling*. Problem always concerns the truth of reality, for nothing exists outside of reality but that which is problematized, that is the potential of being problem. Reality is the concern with what is *properly* intact to be known. A basic issue is thus honesty, since when we honestly confront the issue at hand for the subject, we can no longer ignore that the very notion of problem is a notice of offense.

Conventional philosophy functions to uphold reality while avoiding the demand for a recognition of the inherent problem. The issue is that the subject of conventional philosophy would not notice the identification of philosophy as the problem since philosophy is regularly understood as the only method for how problems are to be addressed and indeed are addressable. The problem is the *manner* by which conventional philosophy approaches, reckons, and attempts to solve the problem. This is an indication of irony in the Kierkegaardian sense.

Note that rationalization is also a most stubborn of defense mechanisms. In this respect, philosophy has been beached on a dysfunctional island of epistemological comfort - the conceptual stagnation induced by an epistemological trauma. To address the trauma, we take the suggestion offered by Babette Rothschild and begin with an epitaph (2010). In line with some newer materialist efforts, we must move retrograde to open instead of close, explore rather than reduce, and move contrary to the conventional philosophical motion, into the trouble, to face it as it is, so we may move forward.

I see the basic problem of philosophy as a method of attempting to solve the issue before a real reckoning of its true parameters and dynamics has been achieved. Philosophically speaking, a true reckoning is found at 'the end' of philosophy, even while the response must be to the 'first'. We must suspend the need for a singular reductive cause and accordant asserted solutions, move inward and deeper, create space, to begin to move at all.

Addressing the Frame

Trouble is stirred up in the routine of (conventional, analytical) philosophical method when we address less the content of ideology (phenomenology) than when we begin to show what the ideology is *in itself*, or reflection qua reflection inside/outside of reflection, for a term. This is troublesome to the subject because the inevitable rebuttal (defense) would be that such a statement is *de facto* ideological and thus ethically obligated to be *de jure*; this is to say the subject refers facts to ethical judgment rather than apprehending and comprehending them in-themselves. To this the correct response is, yes, but not, in this way, *only* subject to ideology, not *always* phenomenological; ethics is indeed ethical, but knowledge does not/should not always answer to ethics. Ethics *should* answer to facts; again, the irony inherent phenomenal existence; it is the ethical function of ideology to deny the irony of reality. With this preoccupation occupying mind, it is no wonder that the subject is always a subject of repression, or in our case, the philosopher must always posit a subjective 'philosophy of'.

We could avoid the psychological implication onto philosophy if it were not that an awareness of problem pervading a subject's ontological semantic, or phenomenology, would, it seems, necessitate a radical shift in orientation in how one reckons what knowledge is as well as what such knowledge should convey to meaning for change. Nonetheless, philosophy regularly stays oriented in an oppressed state of knowledge. To wit, and for the academics, a regimen of knowledge that regularly and methodologically avoids its own issues through addressing only the symptoms of those problems reveals itself as a methodological problem - that is, a phenomenological issue. Reality regularly is found to be the single essential criterion of existence despite reasonable evidence to the contrary. To be more precise, the content of ideology is an ideal state, what we can rightly accord to a mythological world, and, I am not speaking merely to content but rather to an assumption that one should (ought to) be oriented upon content, that is, material. In counseling, we might understand the issue presented thus far, of the client philosophy, as having to do with an avoidance of the truth of itself, and possibly the shame and guilt that arises to reify its identity that is serving to perpetuate a state of knowing that is, at root, incorrect in its estimations of truth.

Philosophy of Philosophy: The Conventional Philosophical State

The content-material state is based in a being of knowledge which is traditionally situated, in terms elaborated upon by Immanuel Kant, as *analytically posteriori*, a being oriented within a misrecognition, a not-recognizing or a denial that its knowledge is upheld by a facet withheld from the real content of knowledge - thus withheld from participating with analysis in the traditional, or conventional, sense. Conventional philosophy and critical theoretical approaches solve this problem by inserting the subject irrevocably into ideology absolutely to, redundantly, justify real ethical concerns. Nonetheless, I have named this assertion-over-denial of misrecognized/mis-cognized knowledge *contradiction* and *paradox*; they concern real determinations by which a synthetical a priori privilege is upheld.

The synthetical a priori is an arbitrary epistemological division that is not *natural*, but by definition, *made up*, fabricated. Then, by contrast, in truth, oddly enough, the *synthetical a priori* is correlational with the *analytical posteriori*. Orientation highlights *The Reason* why Kant situated the analytical posteriori as beyond consideration: he was describing an epistemological privilege of human beings in the universe, all the way up and all the way down, from the general to the

particular. This is the basis of critical theory and social justice narratives. We can discern this orientation upon knowledge involved with positive resultant ‘true’ realities with reference to absolutely real negative falsehoods and the arguments that proceed between them. See, of course, both constitutive conditions of human knowledge arise outside of true things in themselves; the truth lay ‘deep in the middle’ ironically constitutive of ‘both’. To argue the notions that identify ‘truly true and false realities’ might not be the case (an intervention that challenges a ‘core belief’ of conventional philosophy) is to suggest that people do not actually experience and deal with reality. To reiterate, reality *does indeed* involve what is true versus what is false. However, the problem hidden in this real maxim is that the *idea* of there being a real segregated aspect, i.e., that we can find what is true and what is false, is *thus* not separate and that the idea of segregation identifies a situation inconsistent with what the term identifies, as though the term ‘segregate’ falls out of the condition it posits, itself not segregated from its object of reference. Again; to what object does the term ‘segregate’ refer for it to have any meaning at all? It is segregate; what *is segregate*? This is nothing less than to notice that they are both *true in their own truth*, including that what is determined to be false is false *truly*, and not false *falsely* (which has no sense). This, therefore, is merely so much to bring evidence of the assertion (make notice) that the idea must be the criterion of all things. Hence, Kantian idealism rests on this epistemological methodological maxim called contradiction, which identifies the only ideological exclusion allowed by the logic of the scheme of ideas. The *idea itself* is the contradiction, the ‘thought, thought,’ so to speak, removed from analytical scrutiny. However, the true point is *not* that this observation thus requires a correction, for, there is no correction that is ever effective - that is, outside of the idea or belief that there is or can be. Hence, *it is faith which allows for idealism to function to grant the content of reality truly*. It is not mere idea, but indeed that any argument that would propose to disrupt the idea is itself merely another idea, and thus part of the ideological convention. This is the irony that is weighted, and thus dispelled, through faith. We have before us not only a notice of orientation for the whole of Twentieth century analytical (and continental) phenomenology, but indeed a whole historical lineage of thought. Hence, it is sound to say that all conventional philosophy is based on a distortion that we call *reality*. Nonetheless, this is not an accusation; on the contrary, it is but a recognition of the truth of its epistemological method.

Now, the reason why I posit the existence of a conventional philosophical method is due to the fact of there being a different manner to reckon what is philosophically true that does not necessarily answer to the real conventional method; it does not argue against it or attempt to negate it, but simply rests in a different manner of reckoning what knowledge, and what philosophy, is. Its methods may appear similar and indeed overlay, but its semantic and logistical foundations are foreign to the conventional estimations. The only way to avoid a reduction of knowledge to contradiction is to suspend the kind of motion that has yielded this conclusion. This suspension can be understood as a break with the status quo. A rupture exists in philosophical knowledge. The denial of such a rupture is, always and everywhere, the problem.

The Problem Experiment

The significant question upon the problematic client is why does a singular *either/or* method of determination sit upon a paramount and unimpeachable throne of method for the discernment of what exists? We might ponder still why, even in the midst of the conclusion that finds the end of its positing method at contradiction (problem deferred for the sake of the problem manifested) we do not see that it is the method itself that is faulty instead of the content applied to

it? So much problem; why does the client persist –no, insist – in reifying its effect so as to continue to bring complaint? In other words, why can't the content be the criterion instead of the method? Further into the trouble, this is to show that (1) there may be one truth and yet not merely *one other* truth (this or that), but, (2) as the conventional method dictates, indeed an infinite set of multiplicities (those) that must be considered to find *the* truth (of the particular material condition) of the situation, and (3) the actual real truth (1,2, and 3) arises to show (apparently) that everything is relative, subjective, or otherwise based on perspectives that are necessarily biased or incomplete. Ironically then, this function (the real truth) works to indicate that knowledge itself does not truly qualify to the 'one or multiplicity' ideal (above), but indeed should be quantified as concerning exactly 'of the two'. The question must be asked, why would the method withhold its application (that everything is relative and answerable to the exclusion of contradiction) from being enacted upon those two elements, one and multiplicity?

The problem can be identified, again, precisely as what is left out, or withheld from analysis: one or multiplicity excludes any possibility of middle ground. In this situation I thereby bring in the notions of opinion and argument to develop or expose a method alternate to the assumed singular method to explain how this (seemingly now) one real-truth (one or multiplicity) is not actually true but only real. It seems then simple and reasonable to put the assumed method to task upon itself and ask if the *either/or* method that is yielding the conclusion of ontological absolute multiplicity, which in that conclusion contradicts itself (contains an epistemologically denied element) as part of the method, is itself not at fault instead of its content. The *method* is thus identified and indicted rather than its *content*. Resorting to the method that uses content in order to test the method is, itself, a non sequitur. This is the content that the method functions to avoid, saying that there is only *nothing there*. Hence, the method *is* the problem.

How could we arrange this experiment? The simplest would be to see that there are only two components to the tested method, the *either/or* method itself, and that of its opposite, which, according to the method, is called *nothing*. Then, to complete this experiment without resorting to the conventional method, we would leave that polemic to reduce upon itself to posit by the suspension that which is instrumental to the functioning of the method being tested. That instrument is what we know as contradiction, the 'excluded middle', and the position thus exposed is then the content of the contradiction. According to the method and according to the divergent rational direction we must pursue in testing the veracity of the method, this content must be and is *de facto* not a constituent of the conventional method, precisely not content. The catch is, thus, this content must *also* be a constituent, or subject, of the conventional method while at the same moment *not* being a subject. To retain the conceptual solution, which is really a precipitate to this philosophical experiment, we retain a further simplicity the conventional method typically eschews to call this uncovered content *the object of the subject* - or even more simply, the *object*. The form of material.

Orientation

Basic counseling technique finds the route to the truth of the issue at hand. The Two Routes amplifies a discrepancy, or rupture, in the reckoning of conventional philosophical knowledge; it posits that the object of conventional knowledge *is* the contradiction as it is this ideal of contradiction that supports a particular kind of route along which human beings ought to encounter thinking and thus encounter the universe itself. This proper manner I simply call *reality* to in no way suggest that it is false or needing of any conceptual improvement, even while content as

content is effective to render itself improvements, if only arguably so. The truth of this method of not only conceptualizing thought but how thought must ‘move upon the waters’, is constituent of both the real content and that content occupying its contradiction, which signals material’s substance.

Again, *the point is not to negate real knowledge and its method*, for, we are not here specifically involved in the conventional method for reckoning knowledge. The point rests within a configuration of knowledge that now must ask into *teleology*, that is, what is its purpose? With what project is it involved? Further, if we can discern a project, as well a plethora of projects, then how is it possible, or even why, that they should communicate with each other? Why *would* they, but *how could* they communicate? If we are to distinguish between the real philosophical problem and the recognition of truth, then how could any communication occur? We propose no answer for this here. Instead, oddly, we leave the answer to the conventional method itself to figure out, we leave the truth revealed of material to unfold as it will in reality, to ask then what else is happening of knowledge?

In distinction to strict empirical constraints, the mind arises by the functioning of the heart; the semantic economy by the actual ecology, and phenomenological reality by the universe itself. Thus, we ask what physical (ecological) action to this new reckoning of philosophical knowledge is accompanying the attempt to work through philosophy itself? The usual awareness is negligible, yet, I draw attention to what is actually happening; less the noticed measure of difference than what the responses *are*; the thoughts and thinking, the concepts and processes of reasoning are aroused, even aggravated. Yet there are also physical, somatic, ecological, universal, sensibilities. All are stirring. We are so acclimated to being ‘normally’ upset, which is to indicate how our thoughts might be racing to find a rebuttal, we fail to *count* this – thoughts – as a bodily reaction. On the contrary, we put it off to strictly normal mental acuity, and routinely exercise the whole universe through its discernment. In this consideration of knowledge, then, we must ask how, logistically, the thought from concept from feeling from physical sense are sorted? And what about the object in-itself? We then leave the intentional philosophy there to sit in whatever oblivion conventional orientation might evidence about its state. Bringing back into focus the operation of this essay, often clients cannot conceptualize what is occurring in their own body. Shall we begin a new count?

Resource

To move forward with the healing of the trauma implicit the conventional method, we now draw back to resource and re-approach. We return to what we know as given to analysis, to rest in the conventional real/ideal philosophy that grants us reason to believe we arise always and only within the two absolute and essential parameters (i.e. the content of thinking/objective given/empirical/phenomenal reality on one hand, and nothingness on the other), or more gently, what is present-to-hand and what is *withdrawing*. These are easily correlated with well-known scientific physical poles as well. The universe (from atoms, to molecules, to creatures and planets and beyond) names the real ‘at-hand’ (in either of Heidegger’s cases) material, and the ‘black hole/singularity’ marks where exactly all knowledge ‘is endable,’ where nothing begins because everything begins to withdraw from contemplation. If we extend our thinking into the comfort of scientific reckoning, we imagine how we like to be challenged with the ‘uncivilized’ ideas of subatomic and quantum physics and we stay in our comfort as we are delighted with the mysterious

concepts that define that strange level of the universe – but it is still part of ‘the real and known’ universe - that is, oriented in the conventional analytical method.

New Materialism is a body of work that reflects in analytical thought the extent of the universe itself considerations of the content of the universe “counterintuitive to our usual understanding of things or identities having discrete boundaries and qualities proper to them, independent of other entities” (Selberg and Hinton, 2016). Some philosophers have begun to use terms and ideas from quantum physics to explain this known universe. Coming into my essay at a slight tangent from these New analytically formatted proposals, we might begin to wonder whether these authors are *merely* making an argument about the universe with the implied disclaimer that the universe never occurs that way, or whether they are indeed speaking about the actual universe. To address this strange question, then, I close into the gap of contradiction that centers what I am calling the content of contradiction that resides in the blind spot between the two possibilities. This site of nothingness (blindness; the nothingness inhabiting contradiction) may be understood in Karen Barad’s context as a “intra-action” (Barad, 2007), or in others, such as Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology, a relation. I enjoy the resonance with Rebekah Sheldon’s *chora* (2015). Shifting right from the imperfect/perfect materialistic reality, and shifting left from the real withdrawn object, in an allowance for a discovery of true substance to ground the material object, I suggest the truth of such speculated realities is more like an *event horizon*.

There is “a great deal underway” (Harman, 2020, p. 175) in an event horizon. Ironically admitting to a relation that is a ‘Zeno-phillic’ eternal halfway in between things, I feel my point centers more in on what actually arises in contrast to merely being proposed as a good argument or what is given, i.e. the good argument/given constitutes the irony of philosophical absurdity. Conventional knowledge itself, here, is suspended as my point does not move to reduce to what is universally ethical (see Soren Kierkegaard), but neither does it reduce to the conventional method’s antagonist, that vacant void of black hole-ness that is called nothingness (truism, mootness, withdraw). Rather, I concede that together, they constitute what is true of the universe; in truth, the universe abhors a vacuum because there is no actual space of nothing.

The revolt against nothingness provided for the modern Existentialist to find his freedom to say, yes, in reality this is what we do as ethical social creatures. Moreover, as ethical creatures this is how we are able to determine what is real. That is, through arguing from real material – whether it matters or not – to proving or convincing. However, this manner of knowing only provides a sufficient manner to realize the truth of the universe –an argument towards convincing implies a power that may be sufficient to make people want to subscribe to that idea – and therefore must be distinguished from a knowledge that reflects what is necessary, that is, actual truth. The difference unnoticed can very well be understood as a basis of the conventional philosophical problem, the issue that is dealt with, usually and methodologically, through all sorts of lacunae; distortions, denial, projections, and feints of misdirection. To address this more effectively, we might enjoy entertaining a responsibility inherent the “being-with” (Haraway, 2016) the being “withdrawn” (Harman, 2002), the different route we are discussing that resonates with the New Materialisms and the Object Ontologies (respectively) to account for all conventional knowledge as content but also as things themselves in the universe. From thoughts, concepts, and perceptions, which indeed exist in the universe, to quarks, to dark matter, to gravity, to nuclear harbingers and environmental paradigms, even to relations, halfway-essences, and singularities – all these things indeed *must* arise in the universe just as much and as well as lava, trucks, boxes, wands, planets, hydrogen atoms and plasma. As well, all these things lay beyond the question of how thought is able to discern reality *in fact*. We must ask further, then, what of gods and goddesses, demons, and

trolls? Including these strange limits, the significant question now must be how it is that thoughts themselves do not exist in the universe? Or better, *why* are thoughts excluded as existing things or only exist through being efficiently linked along a particular causal chain? As well, do *processes* exist in the universe *as such*? Might we then move into the even more challenging question: does knowledge exist in the universe, likewise, a thing in the universe itself?

Whatever the answer we give, there are only *two* qualities of categories (bridged by Kierkegaard's quantity) of answers. The conventional-analytical answer ponders, classifies, qualifies, and orders information in real circumstances that human beings must always contend with; this is the quality that Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, and Karen Barad, among others, have excelled to disrupt and shed light toward the truth as it appears in reality. By contrast, the true answer speaks of what is actually occurring in the universe as such, even as the conventional approach relegates such knowledge to truism, mootness and outright falsity. By this specific addressing, and respective of Alain Badiou and Francois Laruelle's similarly polemical posits, we must find knowledge arising only through *two routes*, one which reduces and excludes, and one which opens and includes, even while not proclaiming that either method must be ethically qualified or compromised. They are and arise in the universe as such, the material objects, and as the object of the subject. Nonetheless, we might go so far as to suggest that a default to a common analytical, reductive, and real ethical propriety is merely an incorrect manner of assessing the truth of the philosophical situation of knowledge.

Analytical-political disparities occur within a container of sorts, which is, to use Kierkegaard once more, a ubiquitous *either/or* epistemological-ontological method that I am calling the *conventional method*. This method is not thereby false, as though I am arguing it needs to be fixed somehow. Rather, it simply *is* as described in fact arising itself the material of reality. A denial of what is true of reality is the basic form of counseling philosophy.

The Application of the Two Routes in Counseling Philosophy

To allow a focus upon what I mean by *orientation*, the trouble has been set aside to stay with the comfort of the analytical reason, reiterate what we are able to easily understand, and to reduce existential anxiety. Nothing can deride understanding and therapeutic process like unrecognized emotional reactivity.

The Two Routes arise in every instance of knowledge. Reality is constitutive of ideal and material objects, these objects constitute the truth of reality, and such a truth relinquishes knowable content despite any contradictory or paradoxical reality. This content is not merely spiritual or phenomenal reality even as it is most often relegated to this real discursive category.

In line with the Two Routes proposed here for counseling philosophy, my point arises to comment upon the phenomenal subjectivity that reckons knowledge of the truth of things in the realm of a 'cloud of unknowing'. Consistent with what Object-Oriented Ontology proposes of all objects, in reality the object called subjectivity itself withdraws from view to be derided and set aside in immanent opinion and relativity. It is, indeed, through this subjective relativity the truth of universal things is revealed. The truth of things in themselves, existing in the universe truly, relay content that can be known and organized; while not requiring a real epistemological reconciliation, such true content nevertheless not only is concerned with reality but indeed *concerns reality itself*. Reality is concerned with the truth as what is true is universal. Every possible situation of knowledge proposed and or defined is subject to the truth that the Two Routes describes, and the object of every description gives rise to material that is negotiated as to relations

and relationship, which likewise form an ontological maxim, whether such material is associated with matter or not, what matters or is mattering, as indeed it does and it does not.

The issue for which philosophy is brought to be counseled is exactly thus *orientation upon objects*. Less a reconciliation of subjects and objects than a finding of a substantial philosophical knowledge of the universe itself, an epistemological rupture accounts for the problem that lay at root in the conventional method of material reckoning. Given the situation that is come upon when honesty leads the way, the Two Routes provides a sound and reasonable manner through which to understand the true nature of the material subject of the universe, and thus a more substantial philosophical manner upon which to found the practice and discipline of counseling itself, albeit, regardless of what individual theoretical basis real counseling interventions wish to face and promote. Such an object that is the subject grants counseling a whole being, a manifested practice, a thing unto itself, itself for itself as it is in relationship with other things that arise in the universe itself, truly.

Further, to counsel philosophy means a counseling philosophy, just as doing counseling is never disassociated from the subject it counsels; in fact, I find it more proper to say that counseling, the object that arises truly as nothing else but itself, is in an intimate relation with its subject, arising in the universe truly itself, the truth of its phenomenal materiality supplying substance by which the object of counseling takes place, gives place, and has place. The issue of counseling philosophy, while having something to do with subjects and subjectivity, thus concerns nothing less than an orientation upon objects.

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